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Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance:
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany
By Nadja Dwenger, Henrik Kleven, Imran Rasul,
and Johannes Rincke∗
We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance
in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system
has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at
baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deter-
rence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized
compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative
records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treat-
ments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is sub-
stantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-
comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrin-
sic and intrinsic motivations.
JEL: C93, D03, H26
Keywords: Tax compliance; intrinsic motivation; extrinsic moti-
vation; field experiment
Is tax compliance driven only by extrinsic motivations related to deterrence and
tax policy, or is there also a role for intrinsic motivations such as morals, norms
and duty? The economic theory of tax compliance building on Becker (1968) and
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) focuses only on the former and predicts low com-
pliance under low audit probabilities or penalties. This prediction stands in sharp
contrast to the empirical observation that tax compliance is high in modern tax
systems despite very low audit probabilities and modest penalties. The literature
has proposed three ways of resolving this compliance puzzle (e.g. Sandmo 2005,
Slemrod 2007, Kleven 2014).
First, modern tax systems make widespread use of third-party information from
firms and the financial sector, which creates a divergence between observed audit
rates and actual detection probabilities conditional on evading (Kleven, Kreiner
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and Saez, 2009; Kleven et al., 2011). Hence, the notion that deterrence is weak is
to some extent an illusion. Second, theory assumes that taxpayers have perfect
knowledge of deterrence parameters, but in practice there may be misperception.
Survey evidence suggests individuals tend to overestimate audit probabilities and
penalties associated with tax evasion (Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Chetty, 2009).
Third, individuals may comply due to a wide range of non-pecuniary motivations
including moral sentiments, guilt, reciprocity, and social norms (Andreoni, Erard
and Feinstein, 1998; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). We label all such motivations
under the umbrella term intrinsic motivations. The importance of such intrinsic
motivations for compliance is the hardest to measure and study empirically, and
therefore the least well understood.
We consider a context and natural field experiment that provide new insights
on the second and third explanations for the compliance puzzle. In our setting
third-party information reporting is not implemented, and our field experiment
is designed to reveal extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to comply through the
provision of two forms of incentive: (i) the injection of positive deterrence; (ii)
the provision of compliance rewards/recognition.
Our setting is the local church tax in a metropolitan region of Bavaria, Germany.
Three features of this setting are important for the empirical analysis. First,
it combines taxation with charitable giving: the church tax is compulsory and
non-compliance represents a violation of tax law, but the church highlights the
good cause and encourages overpayments that are defined as donations. Hence,
tax evaders and donors can coexist in this system. Second, the true tax base
relevant for the church is defined as reported taxable income to the government,
which we can perfectly observe for each individual by linking church tax records
to administrative income tax records. This allows us to compare actual church
taxes paid with true taxes owed for each individual, and thus precisely distinguish
between evaders, compliers, and donors. This overcomes a key limitation of most
tax evasion studies, namely that the outcome of interest is not observed (Slemrod
and Weber, 2012). Third, even though the church has the legal right to cross-
check filed taxes against income tax returns (which would detect evasion with
certainty), they have not previously exercised this right. In other words, prior to
our field experiment there is zero deterrence in this tax system. Together with
the previous point, this implies we can observe compliance in a baseline with zero
deterrence, providing a direct measure of intrinsically motivated tax compliance.
To guide the empirical analysis, we set out a conceptual framework that unifies
the standard compliance model (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) with the warm-
glow model of public goods contributions (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). The framework
incorporates heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation to allow for the coexistence of
evaders, compliers and donors as in our empirical setting. We use this to char-
acterize the heterogeneous impacts of compliance incentives on evader and donor
types. Our empirical analysis distinguishes throughout between the treatment
responses of extrinsically motivated individuals (those who evade in the zero de-
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terrence baseline) and the responses of intrinsically motivated individuals (those
who comply or donate in the zero deterrence baseline). Our empirical measure
of these motivational types is compelling, because our linked panel data from ad-
ministrative tax records and church records allows us to classify individuals into
behavioral types using their actual pre-treatment compliance behavior.
Our natural field experiment is implemented in collaboration with the Protes-
tant church. We vary the compliance incentives individuals face by manipulating
the official tax notification sent to collect the local church tax: 40, 000 individual
tax payers were randomly assigned to a control group or to one of 12 treatments.
These treatments varied along three dimensions. The first set of treatments sim-
plify the payment of the tax, and aim to correct any misperceptions individuals
may have on audit probabilities. The second set of treatments vary the deter-
rence parameters individuals face. We do this through the announcement of
strictly positive audit probabilities, including both fixed probabilities on all tax-
payers and notched probabilities that depend on the tax payment. The third set
of treatments offer compliance rewards in the form of social recognition, entry
into monetary prize draws, or a combination of the two.
Our main findings are as follows. First, a significant fraction of individuals
comply in the zero deterrence baseline where compliance should be zero absent
intrinsic motivations. Around 20 percent of individuals pay at least the true taxes
owed, while the remaining 80 percent of individuals evade taxes and most of them
fully evade. Hence, intrinsic motivations can account for a substantial amount
of aggregate compliance, but these motives are strongly heterogeneous in the
population. The large majority of individuals behave as rational, self-interested
taxpayers consistent with the Becker-Allingham-Sandmo framework.
Second, there is sharp bunching at exact compliance in the zero deterrence
baseline. As there is no extrinsic incentive to locate at exact compliance under
zero deterrence, such excess bunching requires either a discontinuity in intrinsic
motivation at the point of exact compliance, naturally labelled as a ‘duty to
comply’, or the presence of attention or focal point effects of exact compliance.
While it is in general difficult to distinguish between these explanations, we exploit
our simplification treatment (which makes the point of exact compliance more
salient) to shed light on this. We find that the simplification treatment does not
increase bunching at exact compliance, suggesting that bunching may be driven
more by duty-to-comply preferences.
Third, announcing a zero audit probability (the status quo) has only a small im-
pact on compliance, suggesting there is little misperception on average. Less than
5 percent of baseline compliance can be attributed to misperception of the audit
probability, and hence this is not an important confounder in the measurement
of baseline intrinsic motivation.
Fourth, tax simplification and deterrence have strong effects on compliance for
baseline evaders, but small and mostly insignificant effects for baseline donors.
As the enforcement constraint is not binding for baseline donors, deterrence does
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not directly affect their extrinsic incentives to comply, and hence they should only
respond to this treatment if there is crowd-out or crowd-in between extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations. Our findings are therefore consistent with the absence of
cross-effects between the two types of motivation.
Finally, the provision of compliance rewards has fundamentally different im-
pacts on baseline donors (who increase their donations) and baseline evaders
(who increase their evasion). That is, whether recognition for compliance raises
or reduces tax payments hinges on what motivates taxpayers in the first place,
with positive effects on the intrinsically motivated and negative effects on the
extrinsically motivated. These qualitative patterns arise irrespective of the exact
form of the compliance reward, be it in terms of social recognition, entry into
monetary prize draws, or a combination of both. This suggests that the behav-
ioral effects are driven by what such compliance rewards signal about the tax
institution rather than by the social/private nature of the reward. A natural
interpretation is that rewarding taxpayers for contributing to the public good
(rather than punishing them for not paying their taxes) signals the voluntary as-
pect of a poorly enforced tax system (and so positively affects the warm glow of
donor types) and at the same time downplays the mandatory aspect of a legally
binding tax system (and so may affect evader types negatively).
This paper contributes to the established literature on tax compliance (sur-
veyed by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998;, Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002,
Slemrod and Weber, 2012), and especially advances an emerging literature using
field experiments to study compliance behavior (Blumenthal, Christian and Slem-
rod, 2001; Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian, 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Fellner,
Sausgruber and Traxler, 2013; Hallsworth et al., 2014; Del Carpio, 2014; Pomer-
anz, 2015). Despite the large amount of work on compliance, there is very little
field evidence on the relative importance of, and interaction between, extrinsic
and intrinsic motivations to comply with taxes (see Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
While we are able to make headway on this question due to the features of our
data and setting, we note that these features may also raise issues of external
validity. We discuss such issues in the next section.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background,
Section 3 develops our conceptual framework, Section 4 describes the experiment
and data, Section 5 presents our empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
I. Institutional Background
The payment of church taxes is a legal obligation for all members of the Catholic
and Protestant churches in Germany. There are two separate tiers of church taxes:
the federal state and the church district levels. The state church tax is collected
by state tax authorities, corresponds to around 9 percent of income tax liabilities,
and raises billions of euros annually for both the Protestant and Catholic churches.
The local church tax is collected by decentralized church authorities and is much
smaller in size. The focus of our study is the local church tax collected by the
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Protestant church in a major metropolitan area in Bavaria, covering 68 parishes
that comprise a Church District.1
By default, individuals baptized as Protestants (typically at birth) are church
members and therefore liable to pay the local church tax once they turn 18. The
vast majority of baptized individuals do not attend church as an adult: between
0.8 percent and 8.8 percent of eligible church members regularly attend church
services in our sample parishes. Hence our study is not based on an especially
religious sample compared to the general population. We later provide evidence
on the representativeness of our taxpayer sample.
We now describe three institutional features that are central to our study.
1. Tax base and tax schedule: the local church tax is a progressive income tax
as shown in Figure A1. The schedule is a step function with an exemption level
of e8, 005 in annual income followed by six tax brackets in which the tax liability
varies from e5 in the lowest bracket to e100 in the highest bracket. The tax base
is a broad income measure (wages, business income, capital income, pensions,
etc.) with no deductions. Importantly, the income components included in the
church tax base are also taxable under the personal income tax and must be
reported separately to state tax authorities. By defining the true taxable income
for the church tax as reported taxable income for the personal income tax, the
Church District is essentially leveraging on the far larger administrative capacity
of the state tax authority. Reported taxable income may of course be subject to
misreporting due to personal income tax evasion, but it is still defined as true
income for the purposes of the church tax.
2. Tax collection and enforcement: the Church District mails a tax notification
(shown in the online appendix) to all resident church members in May each year
to collect the local church tax. A bank transfer form pre-filled with the church’s
bank account information and the individual’s local church tax number is attached
to the notice. Church members are asked to self-assess their income and taxes
owed according to the tax schedule, and to transfer the appropriate amount to
the church’s bank account by September. Although the church has the legal
right to cross-check self-assessed income against information from personal income
tax returns held by the state tax authorities (which would detect church tax
evasion with certainty), they have never exercised this right in the past. In other
words, prior to our field experiment, there was zero deterrence in this tax system
and hence any compliance would have to be driven by some form of intrinsic
motivation.2
3. Mandatory taxes and voluntary donations: it is possible for individuals to
1The church tax is not unique to Germany: similar institutions exist in Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland and Sweden. The local church tax also exists in other states in Germany (Saxony, Lower Saxony,
and Rhineland-Palatinate). The fact that the local church tax represents only around 9 percent of total
church revenues is in part due to widespread evasion as we show below.
2Individuals who do not pay their taxes before the September deadline receive a reminder in October,
requesting the transfer of the appropriate amount by the end of the calender year. If the payment has
still not been made by the end of the year, no further action is taken by the Church tax authorities.
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overpay their local church tax liability. Unlike conventional taxes, overpayments
are encouraged and not refunded to individuals. As funds raised mostly remain
within the parish, we can think of such overpayments as charitable donations to
the local public good of parish services. This feature allows for the coexistence of
tax evaders (who pay less than their legal obligation) and donors (who pay more
than their legal obligation). We identify whether an individual is extrinsically or
intrinsically motivated based on her actual past evasion/donation behavior under
the zero enforcement regime.3
While these institutional features are useful for our empirical design, there is
a trade-off with external validity: the features that make this setting well-suited
to study motives for tax compliance are also features that distinguish our setting
from other tax systems. Four potential threats to external validity are worth
discussing. First, the tax is very small and this may affect compliance behavior,
especially if inattention or other optimization frictions are important. We directly
explore the potential role of attention/salience effects in one of our experimental
treatments.
Second, the fact that the local church tax relies on zero enforcement may signal
to taxpayers that, even though the tax is a legal obligation, church authorities do
not consider it an important civic obligation. If so, this would undermine intrin-
sic motivation and imply that our finding of substantial intrinsically motivated
compliance is downwards biased relative to other tax settings.
Third, if the local church tax funds a service that taxpayers value more than
the public expenditures funded by other taxes, this could raise intrinsic motiva-
tions to comply relative to other contexts. To address this point, we note that
our estimates do not differ much across church parishes with varying levels of
participation in religious services. Moreover, to reiterate, participation rates in
church activities are uniformly low and the vast majority of those liable for the
tax are not regular churchgoers as adults.
Fourth, contrary to other tax systems, in our context it is possible that in-
dividuals contribute through direct donations to the church instead of via the
church tax system. This would lead us to underestimate intrinsic motivation in
the baseline (as some tax evaders could be contributing directly) and potentially
overestimate the effect of incentives on revenues (as some of the effect could reflect
substitution between direct contributions and tax payments). However, these po-
tential biases are unlikely to be important in our setting: (i) private individual
donations to the church are very small in Germany (as in many other European
countries), accounting for less than 4 percent of total revenues for the parishes in
our sample; (ii) at the parish level, there is little correlation between changes in
3Besides encouraging overpayments (donations), the social pressures to comply with church taxes are
not very different from those related to standard personal income taxes: whether an individual makes
a payment to the local church tax remains private information, and individual or aggregate information
on compliance is not communicated within or across parishes. Charitable giving is tax deductible in
Germany, and this also applies to overpayments of the local church tax. Hence, there is no incentive to
give to the church separately from the local church tax.
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private donations between 2011 and 2012 (the year of the field experiment) and
the estimated aggregate change in tax revenues caused by our treatments.
II. A Warm-Glow Model of Tax Compliance
To guide the empirical analysis, we present a conceptual framework that uni-
fies the standard deterrence model (Becker, 1968; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972)
with the warm-glow model of public goods donations (Andreoni, 1989, 1990).
Our framework embodies both extrinsic motivations (deterrence) and intrinsic
motivations (warm-glow) to comply with taxes.
We consider taxpayers with true income z¯ facing a tax schedule T (z¯) under
truthful reporting. They decide on reported income z and tax payment T (z)
facing a probability of audit and penalty for evasion. Denoting consumption by
c, utility is given by u (c, T (z) , s) where the inclusion of taxes paid T (z) as an
explicit argument captures the warm glow of giving, or intrinsic motivation, and
s is a preference parameter capturing the strength of such intrinsic motivation.
We assume that the marginal rate of substitution between intrinsic and extrinsic
benefits u′T /u
′
c is increasing in s and equal to zero for s = 0. We allow for
heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation, captured by a cdf F (s). The Allingham-
Sandmo model corresponds to the special case where all individuals have s = 0.4
Agents choose reported income z to maximize expected utility, which can be
written as
(1− p) · u (z¯ − T (z) , T (z) , s)
(1) +p · u (z¯ − T (z)− I {z < z¯} [1 + θ] [T (z¯)− T (z)] , T (z) , s) ,
where p is the audit probability, θ is the penalty rate on tax evasion, and I {z < z¯}
is an indicator for evading taxes. This specification naturally assumes that warm
glow depends on the voluntary tax payment T (z) in both the audited and unau-
dited states. That is, an evader does not obtain warm glow from being forced to
pay additional taxes T (z¯)− T (z) due to an audit.
Consistent with our empirical setting, the model allows for taxpayers to fall
in three different categories: Those who underpay taxes T (z) < T (z¯) (evaders),
those who pay exactly the right amount T (z) = T (z¯) (compliers), and those who
overpay taxes T (z) > T (z¯) (donors). Changes in extrinsic or intrinsic incentives
create movements across these three compliance categories (extensive margin) and
reporting responses within the evasion and donor categories (intensive margin).
Consider first the intensive margin choice of z, which is governed by
(2) (1− p)u′cN + p (1− I {z < z¯} [1 + θ])u′cA = E
[
u′T
]
,
4Allingham and Sandmo (1972) did consider a case with social stigma from being caught evading,
but the stigma idea is conceptually different from the warm-glow idea analyzed here.
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where u′cN and u
′
cA
denote marginal utilities of consumption in the non-audited
and audited states, respectively, while E [u′T ] is the expected marginal utility of
tax payments due to intrinsic motivation. This condition highlights the trade-off
between the extrinsic (consumption) costs and the intrinsic (warm glow) benefits
of paying taxes.5 In online appendix A.1 we formally characterize intensive margin
responses to changes in deterrence and the strength of warm glow. We show
that, under a natural assumption on preferences, deterrence increases reported
income for evaders while it does not affect reported income for donors. The
differential deterrence response between evaders and donors follows from the fact
that enforcement is not a binding constraint for donors.
Consider now the extensive margin choice between being an evader, complier
or donor. The model predicts bunching at the point of exact compliance z = z¯
due to the fact that evaders and donors are treated asymmetrically: In the event
of an audit, evaders have to pay the unpaid tax topped up by the penalty rate θ,
whereas donors are not reimbursed for the overpaid tax nor rewarded at rate θ.
This asymmetry creates a kink in the consumption possibility set at z = z¯ and
produces excess bunching at this point. Formally, assuming smooth preferences,
there exists cutoffs s¯1, s¯2 such that a fraction F (s¯1) of the population are evaders
(z < z¯), a fraction F (s¯2)−F (s¯1) are compliers (z = z¯), and a fraction 1−F (s¯2)
are donors (z > z¯). The cutoffs are given by
(3)
u′T (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯1)
u′c (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯1)
= 1−p [1 + θ] and u
′
T (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯2)
u′c (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯2)
= 1,
implying s¯1 < s¯2 and therefore excess bunching at z = z¯ for any positive deter-
rence incentive, p [1 + θ] > 0. In online appendix A.1 we characterize extensive
margin responses to changes in deterrence and the strength of warm glow. We
show that stronger deterrence reduces the fraction of evaders, increases the frac-
tion of compliers (bunching), and does not affect the fraction of donors. Stronger
warm glow, on the other hand, reduces the fraction of evaders and increases the
fraction of donors, leaving the effect on the fraction of compliers indeterminate.
Our empirical setting starts from a baseline of zero deterrence in which the tax
authority never audits (p = 0). In this case, equation (2) shows that reported
income z satisfies u′T /u
′
cN
= 1 for each taxpayer, so that compliance is driven
solely by intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, from equation (3) we have s¯1 = s¯2
and therefore zero excess bunching at exact compliance. Empirically, however,
we find strong bunching at exact compliance even in the zero deterrence baseline.
There are two potential reasons for this that can easily be incorporated in the
model. The first possibility is that intrinsic motivation (warm-glow preferences)
feature a discontinuity at z = z¯. This would be the case if taxpayers are dis-
cretely more motivated to be law-abiding than to be marginal evaders, naturally
5In the Allingham-Sandmo model where s = 0, we have E
[
u′T
]
= 0 and I {z < z¯} = 1 in which case
(2) simplifies to the standard condition u′cA/u
′
cN
= (1− p) / (pθ).
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labelled duty-to-comply preferences. This could be accounted for by allowing for
a discrete jump in warm glow (a notch) at exact compliance. The second pos-
sibility is that exact compliance is a focal point and that bunching is therefore
driven by attention or salience effects. As we precisely measure compliance in
the zero deterrence baseline, we are able to estimate the amount of such intrinsi-
cally motivated bunching and to use our experiment to explore if it is driven by
duty-to-comply or attention.
III. Design, Data and Empirical Method
A. The Natural Field Experiment
The Protestant church mails out a tax notification for the local church tax in
May of each year. Our field experiment manipulated the content of notifications
sent out in 2012. Mail-out recipients were randomly assigned either to a con-
trol group, or one of three groups of treatment. The first group of treatments
simplify the details of the tax, and correct any misperception individuals might
have on audit probabilities. The second group of treatments manipulate deter-
rence parameters through the suggestion of strictly positive audit probabilities
or an audit probability notch. The third group of treatments offers compliance
rewards/recognition.6
The online appendix shows the format and content of the mail-out letter for the
control group (T1). The same mail-out design had been used in earlier years. This
standard notification comprises a cover page (with the remittance slip at the foot
of the first page) and an information leaflet about church activities. The standard
mail-out clearly states on the front page that, “the local church tax forms part
of the general church tax”, and that the “letter serves as a tax certificate”. On
the second page it makes precise that the tax is “a compulsory contribution”
and explicitly lists the legal foundations for the tax. However, in other regards,
the standard mail-out appears poorly designed: important details such as the
payment deadline and tax schedule are only mentioned on the second page. We
now describe how the mail-out design varied in each treatment group. Table A1
overviews all the treatments and provides the exact wording used in each.7
Treatment Group 1: Tax Simplification and Misperception. — The tax sim-
plification treatment (T2) makes two changes to the tax notification design: (i) it
is significantly shorter and makes salient the legal obligation to pay; (ii) payment
6Following procedures from earlier tax years, a reminder was sent to non-payers in October 2012.
The reminder letter is the same for all and makes no mention of the original treatment assignment. The
reminder sets a final payment deadline of December 31st 2012.
7Cagala, Glogowsky and Rincke (2015) present evidence from a small-scale survey among a random
sample of those liable for the Catholic church tax in Bavaria: almost 90 percent of those receiving a tax
notification confirmed they had read it. Hence, while our analysis focuses throughout on intent-to-treat
effects, the corresponding average treatment effects should only be slightly scaled up.
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deadlines and the tax schedule are presented on the cover page. All other design
aspects remained unchanged relative to the control group. We might reasonably
expect tax simplification to impact baseline evaders because some non-compliance
might be driven by them being misinformed/inattentive towards the local church
tax.
All subsequent treatments then add one paragraph on the cover page of this
simplified mail-out (as shown in the online appendix). While it is well known
among taxpayers that enforcement is lax in this setting, the misperception treat-
ment (T3) aims to correct for any remaining misperception by making explicit
that there is zero enforcement of the tax. This is communicated by explicitly
stating that p = 0. We assigned twice as many individuals to this treatment than
to any other treatment to ensure we had statistical power to detect changes in
tax payments arising from potential misperception. The natural comparison is
with T2.
As with the simplification treatment, we might expect responses to the misper-
ception treatment to vary across taxpayer types: some baseline compliers might
have been paying the tax because they previously perceived p to be larger than
zero. By making explicit that p = 0, the treatment intends to fully eliminate
extrinsic motivation for compliance, so that tax payments can only be driven by
some form of intrinsic motivation. T3 therefore allows us to cleanly estimate the
importance of such intrinsically motivated compliance.
Treatment Group 2: Deterrence. — The second group of treatments inject
deterrence into the tax system. They do so by informing taxpayers the audit
probability p is unconditionally set to some strictly positive value, namely p = 0.1,
0.2 or 0.5. These p-treatments are denoted T4, T5 and T6, respectively, and make
clear that the church district has the legal right to delegate tax enforcement to
the church tax authorities, to whom a tax filer’s income is known. The natural
comparison group for these p > 0 treatments is the p = 0 treatment, so that we
pin down the precise comparative static impacts of deterrence through ∆p.
These p-treatments were truthfully implemented in that income self-assessment
was verified, but in practice no monetary penalty followed if the individual was
caught misreporting. Like previous tax enforcement field experiments, we do not
observe individual beliefs about penalties. These beliefs are particularly difficult
to gauge in our context, because the zero-audit policy of the church implies that
taxpayers have never had to face penalties. However, the conceptual framework
makes precise that any behavioral response to p > 0 must reflect a positive
expected penalty.
A final deterrence treatment (T7) introduces an audit probability notch: indi-
viduals face an audit probability of 0.5 if they pay less than or equal to e10, and
face a zero audit probability otherwise. There are two natural comparison groups
to this notch treatment: the T3 misperception treatment that sets p = 0, and the
T6 treatment that sets p = 0.5 for all payments.
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Treatment Group 3: Compliance Rewards. — The final group of treatments
are designed to reveal motivations for compliance through the provision of re-
wards/recognition. These treatments differ in the exact form in which the reward
for compliance is provided. The first offers a potential reward in the form of social
recognition (T8), through a small probability of an individual’s timely compliance
being publicly announced in a local newspaper. The next two treatments offer
entry into monetary prize draws as a reward for complying, a purely private form
of recognition that is unannounced to others. There are two randomly assigned
reward values (e250, e1000), denoted Treatments T9 and T10. The final form
of reward combines social and private recognition for compliance, so taxpayers
have the opportunity to be named in a local newspaper and to be entered in the
higher valued prize draw. This treatment is denoted T11.8
For all these compliance rewards, the probability of winning the reward is close
to zero: for the social recognition treatment this follows from the fact that many
individuals pay some church tax and are therefore potentially eligible for the
newspaper acknowledgement; for the monetary reward treatment the notification
makes explicit that the probability of winning is 1/1000. As such, these com-
pliance rewards have essentially no impact on the (expected) extrinsic incentives
individuals face to comply, and so they should change compliance only if they
impact intrinsic motivation. In particular, individuals may respond to the offer
of such rewards if they affect perceptions about the nature of the tax institution.
Indeed, a natural interpretation of such treatments is that rewarding taxpayers
for contributing to the public good (rather than punishing them for not paying
their taxes) signals the voluntary aspect of a poorly enforced tax system, and at
the same time downplays the mandatory aspect of a legally binding tax system.
If so, compliance rewards may have heterogenous impacts across baseline types,
with donor types being encouraged to respond positively and evader types being
more negatively impacted.
Finally, we also implemented treatments that provide information on social
norms over compliance, or that use moral suasion. The literature has consid-
ered very similar treatments (Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod, 2001; Fellner,
Sausgruber and Traxler, 2013) and so we do not focus on them. In the online
appendix we discuss fully the weak effects of such cheap talk letters, very much
replicating findings in the literature.
8Rewards were offered for payments of at least e5 (not the true payment owed) to prevent individuals
inferring any change in likelihood of being audited. The winners of all rewards were drawn by lot, before
local church officials in December 2012 and immediately notified about their prize. Winners of the
social reward had to provide consent for their name to be published. The advertisement thanking church
members for their local church tax payment was published in early 2013 (after the final payment deadline
of December 31st 2012 to avoid any impact on outstanding payments). Monetary prizes were paid in
private in January 2013.
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B. Data Sources
Our analysis links panel data from two administrative data sources: church
district records containing actual church taxes paid by each individual T (z), and
state income tax records containing true church taxes owed T (z¯) as implied by
reported taxable income to the federal state. Church taxes due in year t depend
on reported taxable income to the federal state in year t−1. The church district’s
payment records cover 2008-12, which we have linked with the state’s income tax
records for 2007-11 using information on names, date of birth, and zip code.
The linked sample consists of 39, 782 individuals that are included in the field
experiment.9
Table A2 presents evidence on the representativeness of our sample relative to
other subgroups of tax filers in 2007, the last year for which nationwide personal
income tax statistics are available.10 There are only minor differences in gender,
age, children, taxable incomes, and income sources between our sample (Columns
1a, 1b) and: (i) the general population in the same metro area (Columns 2a,
2b); (ii) non-church members in the same metro area (Columns 3a, 3b). These
similarities are not altogether surprising: those liable for the church tax are indi-
viduals baptized, typically at birth, into the church; as adults, the vast majority of
them do not attend church regularly and hence our sample is not skewed towards
overrepresenting religious individuals.
The other sampling concern relates to attrition from our linked panel. Individ-
uals can attrit for multiple reasons: falling below the tax exemption threshold,
relocating outside the Church District, not filing a tax return, or opting-out of
the Protestant church. This last cause is of most concern for the interpretation
of our results. However, rates of attrition are relatively low: less than 3 percent
of individuals attrit each year for any reason, and 87 percent of individuals are
observed in all years 2008-12. In the online appendix we provide evidence on the
correlates of attrition, and summarize those findings as showing: (i) attrition is
9Our administrative tax records allow us to observe tax compliance behavior across the income
distribution. As the lower portion of Figure A1 highlights: 29 percent of our sample have an income
below e24,999 (falling into the first two payment bins), while 13 percent of the sample has an income
above e70,000 and lies in the highest payment bin. There are two restrictions on the data linkage. First,
administrative records are available only for those that file a tax declaration. In the area our study
is based in, 60 percent of Protestants file a tax declaration. Second, the tax base for the local church
tax is individual taxable income. This raises an issue among joint filers: in the administrative records,
individual shares of taxable household income are available only for joint filers who belong to different
religious denominations. Hence we exclude married couples in which both spouses are Protestants (thus
ameliorating concerns over within household treatment spillovers). Given the advice of the church, we
also excluded individuals 75 years or older from the field experiment.
10In Germany, individuals are obliged to file a tax return if they receive business income or income from
self-employment: around 38 percent of the population files a tax return. Single filers comprise unmarried
individuals and married couples who choose to file two separate tax returns. The vast majority of married
couples are joint filers and benefit from the associated reduction in the progressivity of the personal
income tax. One parent of each underage child is entitled to child allowances. Tax raising communities
in Germany refer to religious communities that collect taxes within the scope of the personal income tax.
The Protestant and Catholic churches are by far the largest tax raising communities and cover around
60 percent of the population.
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uncorrelated to treatment assignment; (ii) there is no differential attrition across
treatments by past compliance behavior. Our working sample is based on those
89 percent of individuals (35, 603) for whom we observe taxable income for up to
four years pre-treatment (2008-11).
Individuals were randomly assigned to treatment within strata.11 Table A4
presents evidence on sample characteristics and balance across treatments. Around
51 percent of our taxpayer sample are men, the average age is 45, 42 percent are
married, half have at least one child, and average taxable income is e43, 000.
Column 10 shows an F-test of the significance of the covariate set from being
assigned to that specific group relative to the T1 control group (in brackets) and
the T2 Tax Simplification (in braces). The evidence shows the samples are well
balanced across treatments.12
C. Identifying Evaders, Compliers and Donors
As we observe both actual tax payments T (z) and true taxes owed T (z¯), we
can precisely measure compliance at the individual level and therefore estimate
compliance responses to the different experimental treatments. What is more, our
panel data allows us to measure pre-treatment compliance behavior from 2008-
11, a period with zero tax enforcement and therefore no extrinsic incentive to
comply. This allows us to identify baseline compliance types under zero enforce-
ment: baseline evaders are those who underpay pre-treatment, baseline compli-
ers are those who pay exactly the right amount, and baseline donors are those
who overpay. These categories then proxy for motivational types, with baseline
compliers/donors being intrinsically motivated and baseline evaders being extrin-
sically motivated. The ability to distinguish between these different types enables
us to study heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to motivation, thereby
speaking to the interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic incentives, and com-
pare with our conceptual framework which predicts that those effects should be
strongly heterogeneous.
While information on past behavior can be combined in many ways to define
baseline types, we use a simple approach based on individual behavior in 2011,
the year immediately preceding our field experiment.13 Using one year of data
to identify baseline types is reliable in our setting, because of a high degree of
11Two randomization strata were used: (i) the individual’s church tax bracket in 2011; (ii) the number
of pre-treatment years the individual is observed for in the administrative records.
12The other key identifying assumption is that there are no spillovers across treatments. Four points
bolster the credibility of our design on this point: (i) on within-household spillovers, we reiterate that our
sample matched to administrative tax records only covers households in which one spouse is Protestant;
(ii) individuals in the Church hierarchy were excluded from the field experiment, including administra-
tive staff, priests, and a few historically generous donors; (iii) there was no media coverage of the field
experiment; (iv) we set up a telephone enquiry line for individuals to call in case they had any com-
ments/queries after receiving their tax notification: this received 162 calls in total (corresponding to 0.34
percent of treated individuals), with queries mostly relating to the tax base.
13Columns 11 to 13 in Table A4 show the samples across treatments to be balanced within each of
these baseline types.
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persistence in individual behavior across years. To see this, note that for the
balanced panel of individuals in our control group that are observed for all years
2008-11: (i) evaders in 2011 had on average evaded for 2.79 out of the previous
three years, while compliers/donors in 2011 had on average complied/donated
for 2.09 out of the previous three years. Table A5 documents the high degree of
persistence in individual behavior over time using a multinomial logit model. To
summarize, we find: (i) the best predictor of current compliance type is lagged
type: for example, those who evaded in 2010 are 87 times more likely to evade
in 2011 relative to complying; (ii) most other covariates have no predictive power
on being an evader or a donor relative to a complier.14
D. Empirical Method
We first consider extensive margin responses to the different treatments, esti-
mating a linear probability model,
(4) Prob (i evades) = α+ βI(Ti = j) + piEi,pre + λs + ui,
where I(Ti = j) is an indicator equal to one if individual i is assigned to treat-
ment j, Ei,pre is the number of times individual i has evaded in the pre-treatment
years, λs are dummies for randomization strata, and ui is an error term. The
coefficient of interest β measures the percentage point impact of treatment on the
probability of evasion.15 We estimate an analogous specification for the probabil-
ity of donating as a function of treatment (conditioning on the number of times
the individual donated in pre-treatment years, Di,pre).
16
We also consider total responses that combine the extensive and intensive mar-
gins. Here we estimate the OLS specification
(5) yi = δ + γI(Ti = j) + θy¯i,pre + λs + εi,
where yi is the tax payment of individual i post-treatment, y¯i,pre is the average tax
payment pre-treatment, and I(Ti = j) and λs are as defined above. In addition to
tax payments, we also consider a coarser compliance outcome that gives us more
14Older individuals are significantly more likely to donate. Those with wage income or liable for trade
tax (a proxy for being an entrepreneur) are significantly more likely to evade, all else equal. However,
the marginal impacts of these covariates are far smaller than the impact of the individual’s own past
compliance. If there are high transactions costs of compliance, individuals might periodically pay large
amounts so to, on average over time, pay the total payment owed. To check for this we examined whether
those that donate in any given tax year are significantly less likely to make a payment the following year:
we find no evidence for this pattern of payments.
15If we leave out pre-treatment compliance Ei,pre and strata fixed effects λs, the specification cor-
responds to a simple comparison of means across treatment groups. We consider this unconditional
specification in the online appendix, and show that it gives very similar results as (4).
16All the extensive margin results reported are also robust to estimating a multinomial logit model
for choice type k (evader, complier, donor), conditioning on treatment assignment, the number of times
individual i has been of type k (evader, complier, donor) in the pre-treatment years, and dummies for
the randomization strata.
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statistical power: a dummy variable equal to one if the individual increases the
tax payment over its pre-treatment level.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Compliance in the Zero Deterrence Baseline
We begin by exploiting an important feature of our setting: that we can ac-
curately measure tax compliance in a legally binding tax system with a zero
deterrence baseline. If such zero deterrence is well understood (as we largely
confirm below), there should be zero compliance absent intrinsic motivations to
pay taxes. Table 1 documents compliance in the baseline using data from the
T1 Control group. Column (1) shows the full sample, while columns (2)-(3) split
the sample into evaders (the extrinsically motivated) and compliers/donors (the
intrinsically motivated). Three points are of note.
First, a significant fraction of individuals comply in the zero deterrence baseline:
20.9 percent of individuals make a payment greater than or equal to their true tax
liability, while the remaining 79.1 percent make a payment smaller than their true
tax liability. Second, among the evaders, 91.9 percent of them are full evaders and
pay zero tax, while the remaining 8.1 percent are partial evaders and pay some
tax. Third, among those that make at least the correct payment, 55.5 percent
are exact compliers and 44.5 percent are donors.
These findings have implications for the compliance puzzle debate. The fact
that almost 80 percent of individuals evade and 73 percent fully evade in the zero
deterrence baseline implies that the Becker-Allingham-Sandmo framework is 70-
80 percent correct in our setting. At the same time, there coexists a substantial
fraction of individuals whose compliance is driven by some form of intrinsic moti-
vation not captured by the standard model: about 20 percent comply or overpay
and about 27 percent pay at least something even though the tax system is com-
pletely unenforced. Hence, both sides of the compliance puzzle debate may feel
justified: while the Becker-Allingham-Sandmo model is a good approximation for
the majority of taxpayers, it does leave out a non-trivial element of intrinsically
motivated tax compliance.17
Duty-to-Comply. — As the conceptual framework makes clear, individuals have
no extrinsic incentive to bunch at exact compliance in the zero deterrence baseline.
17We note that the compliance/donation rate of 20.9 percent to the local church tax is far higher
than those typically observed in large-scale field experiments on charitable giving, where response rates
typically vary between 2 percent and 5 percent for fundraising campaigns, despite those campaigns often
being targeted to those with affinity towards the charitable cause (Karlan and List, 2007; Huck, Rasul
and Shephard, 2015). This suggests the local church tax is not viewed merely as a form of charitable
donation, and that the legal obligation to pay has significant bite. This is reaffirmed if we recall that
the vast majority of baptized individuals do not participate in church activities (with attendance rates
less than 5 percent in the average parish). Hence intrinsic motivation does not appear entirely due to
behaviors confined to the religious.
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Such bunching requires either a discontinuity in intrinsic motivation at exact
compliance, naturally labelled as a ‘duty-to-comply’, or that the point of exact
compliance represents a focal point for intrinsically motivated taxpayers.
Figure 1A presents descriptive evidence on such bunching by showing, for those
that make a positive payment, the histogram of differences between taxes paid
and taxes owed in the T1 Control group. This shows large and sharp bunching at
T (z) = T (z¯) despite no extrinsic incentive to locate there. We use the bunching
methodology developed by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) to quantify the
amount of excess bunching at exact compliance: the bunching estimate shown in
the figure, b = 7.2, implies over seven times as many taxpayers are observed at
exact compliance than would be otherwise expected given smooth preferences as
inferred from other parts of the distribution of T (z)−T (z¯). The strong tendency
of intrinsically motivated taxpayers to comply exactly with the letter of the law
can also be gauged from Table 1. This table shows that, among the 20 percent of
individuals who feature some form of intrinsic motivation to comply, more than
half of them locate at the point of exact compliance.
It is conceptually difficult to distinguish between duty-to-comply and atten-
tion/focal point explanations for the observed bunching at exact compliance, and
to some extent this can be viewed as a matter of labelling rather than substance.
Nevertheless, in the next section we attempt to make progress on the distinction
between the two explanations by considering how bunching changes in response
to our simplification treatment, which makes the point of exact compliance more
salient.
B. Compliance Responses to Treatment
Table 2 presents our core results on how tax compliance is causally affected by
tax simplification (Panel A), misperception (Panel B), deterrence (Panel C), and
compliance rewards (Panel D). For each panel we show both extensive margin and
total responses in three samples: the full sample, baseline evaders (extrinsically
motivated), and baseline donors (intrinsically motivated). The full sample results
are presented in Part I of Table 2, while the results for baseline evaders and
baseline donors are shown in Part II. The extensive response estimates are based
on the linear probability model (4) for the probability of evading and an analogous
specification for the probability of donating. The total response estimates are
based on the specification in (5): the outcomes we consider are the total tax
payment and the probability of increased payment. All treatment effects are
reported as percentages of the average outcomes in the relevant comparison group,
and at the foot of each panel we show the average outcome in the comparison
group.
Tax Simplification. — Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the T2 Tax
Simplification treatment. Pooling all taxpayers, Columns (1)-(4) show that sim-
plification (i.e. making salient the legal obligation to pay and making deadlines
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and the tax schedule more prominent) significantly reduces the probability of eva-
sion by 2.45 percent, and causes individuals to significantly increase tax payments
by 9.73 percent. The remaining Columns in Panel A show the effects on both
margins to be driven by baseline evaders (Columns 5-8). In this subsample of
taxpayers, simplification of the tax notification significantly reduces the probabil-
ity of evasion by 2.66 percent, and increases payment amounts by 43.4 percent.
The fact that extrinsically motivated individuals are not more likely to donate
(Column 6) highlights that the primary response to the simplification treatment is
largely driven by such individuals changing their behavior from being full evaders
to being exact compliers.
On baseline donors, Columns (9)-(12) show tax simplification has no signifi-
cant impact on either margin of behavior. These null impacts suggest their tax
compliance is not driven by them being confused. All the findings are robust to
unconditionally estimated treatment effects as documented in the online appendix
(Table A6).18
Taken together, the results of the tax simplification treatment imply that a con-
siderable degree of tax evasion may be due to the complexity of tax notifications.
Our results contribute to a nascent empirical literature examining the real world
importance of salience/information costs for taxes and benefits (Chetty, Looney
and Kroft, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009; Chetty and Saez, 2013; Bhargava and Manoli,
2015). Although not part of our framework, these findings can be couched in
the notion that the complexity of a decision making environment drives status
quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991) or that subjects can only take
a small number of tax rules into account (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011). Either inter-
pretation is consistent with the documented responses to simplification and the
high degree of persistence in behavior over pre-treatment years shown in Table
A5 for example.19
Finally, we use the tax simplification treatment to probe further our finding of
excess bunching at exact compliance in the zero deterrence baseline. As stated
earlier, it is in general difficult to distinguish between duty-to-comply and focal
point/attention explanations for such excess bunching. One way to make headway
on the distinction is to exploit our simplification treatment, which makes the point
of exact compliance more salient. If attention is the main reason for bunching
18We further note that all these findings are additionally robust to: (ii) controlling only for random-
ization strata; (ii) excluding controls for pre-treatment behaviors; (iii) additionally controlling for the full
set of individual controls shown in the balancing Table A4; (iv) restricting the sample to the balanced
panel of individuals observed in all tax years 2007-10.
19Boyer, Dwenger and Rincke (2014) present evidence from a natural field experiment related to
the equivalent Catholic Church tax in Bavaria. Their experiment is designed to make salient the local
church tax is legally binding. Their paper and field experiment were developed entirely subsequent to
our analysis and the methods they use to measure intrinsic motivation are based on those presented in
this paper. They find such manipulations of tax notifications significantly increase compliance among
those identified to be extrinsically motivated, and actually reduce compliance of those identified to be
intrinsically motivated. The first of these results closely mirrors our finding on tax simplification: some
non-compliance is likely driven by misunderstanding of or inattention towards the local church tax. The
second result links to our later study of compliance rewards, that highlight intrinsic motivations can be
impacted by how the tax institution is viewed.
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at exact compliance, one would expect bunching to increase in response to the
simplification treatment. In Figure 1B we therefore show the difference in the
densities of T (z)−T (z¯) between the Tax Simplification and Control groups. The
graph clearly shows that the simplification treatment does not increase bunching
at exact compliance, pushing further the interpretation towards such bunching
being driven by duty-to-comply preferences.20
Misperception. — Our ability to measure intrinsic motivations at baseline hinges
on taxpayers being aware that there is zero deterrence. We now test this assertion
using the T3 Misperception treatment where we make explicit that p = 0. On all
other dimensions this treatment is identical to the T2 Tax Simplification letter,
which is therefore the natural comparison group.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results. Columns (1)-(4) show that averaging
across all taxpayers, there are no significant effects of trying to correct for mis-
perceptions on either the extensive or total response margins. However, breaking
down the impacts across taxpayer types, the remaining columns show that cor-
recting misperception does have a small but statistically significant effect on the
behavior of baseline evaders: they become significantly more likely to evade when
they are explicitly told there is zero deterrence, and their tax payments fall (al-
though this effect is not statistically significant).21
These findings confirm that compliance in the zero deterrence baseline is virtu-
ally unaffected by misperception and is therefore largely intrinsically motivated.
That there is little misperception at baseline is not very surprising: the complete
absence of enforcement in this established tax system is unlikely to go unnoticed,
especially since this has been the status quo for a long time. Of course, while
these findings help rule out misperception as a confounder in our setting, they do
not imply that misperception is a non-trivial issue in other enforcement settings.
In systems with non-zero deterrence, given that deterrence strategies are typically
confidential, there remains scope for misperception among taxpayers (Scholz and
Pinney, 1995; Chetty, 2009; Del Carpio, 2014).
Deterrence. — In the standard Allingham-Sandmo framework, tax compliance
is driven by extrinsic incentives due to audit probabilities (p) and penalties (θ).
Panel C of Table 2 documents the compliance impact of higher audit probabilities
by pooling together the treatments that inject strictly positive audit probabilities
p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 (treatments T4-T6) into the zero enforcement baseline. To make
the variation completely unambiguous and increase power, we compare all these
20While duty motives have been much discussed in the literature (Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Andreoni,
Erard and Feinstein, 1998), we are among the first to provide non-parametric evidence of such effects.
21These responses among baseline evaders underpin the credibility of our experimental design: the
fact that they are willing to evade more when told that the tax system is not enforced suggests that the
notification letters were viewed as authentic by those taxpayers.
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positive p-treatments to the T3 Misperception treatment in which p = 0. This
eliminates noise from idiosyncratic variation in perception.
Considering first the full sample of taxpayers, Columns (1)-(4) show that in-
creased deterrence causes significant reductions in the probability of evasion, in-
creases in the probability of donating, and increased tax payments. Considering
heterogeneous treatment responses in the remaining columns, we see that the de-
terrence effects on both margins are nearly entirely driven by their impacts on
baseline evaders (the extrinsically motivated). These results are largely consis-
tent with our conceptual model, which predicts positive deterrence effects on the
extrinsically motivated and zero deterrence effects on the intrinsically motivated
for whom enforcement is not a binding constraint (see Propositions 1 and 2 in
the online appendix A.1).
Two further points are of note. First, the magnitude of each impact is quantita-
tively similar to those documented in Panel A on Tax Simplification. Second, the
weak response to these deterrence treatments among the intrinsically motivated
speak to the literature examining the potential crowd-out of intrinsic motivations
from the provision of extrinsic incentives. For example, if intrinsically motivated
taxpayers believe that under p > 0, other individuals pay taxes only because of
deterrence, this could erode their own intrinsic or social motivation to comply by
changing perceptions about other taxpayers’ true motives. Our results suggest
that no such extrinsic-intrinsic crowd-out exists in this setting; if anything we
observe a slight crowd-in of intrinsic motivations.
In Table 3, Panel A we break down the pooled impact into the separate impacts
of each of the uniform audit probability treatments (again, we split the table into
Part I for the full sample and Part II for baseline evaders and baseline donors).
This reveals the additional insight that the deterrence effects are quite similar
across treatments T4 to T6. This lack of gradient could be an artefact of how
individuals perceive audit-threat letters like T4-T6: they may respond to the gen-
eral message of stronger deterrence rather than the specific probability provided.
Audit probabilities communicated through such letters are likely to be perceived
differently than audit probabilities inferred from actual audit experiences over
time. This is of course a generic issue for all tax enforcement experiments, not
just ours. We next analyze a different kind of audit-threat letter than what has
been considered in the previous literature—namely the audit notch treatment
T7—which works very powerfully and suggests that there is a gradient.
Notched Audit Probabilities. — In the notched audit probability treatment
T7, the tax notification letter announces p = 0.5 for payments less than or equal
to e10 and p = 0 for payments above e10. Such a notch provides a strong
incentive for individuals who would otherwise pay less than or equal to e10 to
pay just above e10, thereby creating a hole in the payment distribution below the
cutoff and excess bunching in the payment distribution just above the cutoff. The
theory of notches and how to use them to estimate behavioral responses has been
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developed by Kleven and Waseem (2013). Here we build on their methodology
by taking advantage of the fact that the notch is randomized.
The top panels of Figure 2 illustrate conceptually how individuals should re-
spond to notches by comparing (hypothetical) density distributions of payments
for individuals in the audit notch treatment group (solid red line in Panel A) and
the control group (dashed black line in Panel A). The density for the audit notch
group features missing mass at and below the cutoff along with excess bunching
just above, whereas the density for the control group is smooth around the cutoff
as they do not face the notch. Panel B shows the difference in densities between
the treatment and control groups: this difference will be zero above the bunch
due to random assignment.
The bottom panels of Figure 2 show empirical density differences between the
audit notch treatment group and different comparison groups. The comparison
group in Panel C is the T2 Tax Simplification treatment, while the comparison
group in Panel D is the T3 Misperception treatment. As the raw distributions are
lumpy because most individuals pay in one of the statutory tax bins (0, 5, 10, 25,
45, 70, 100), we show the distributions in e5 bins, and average densities within
statutory tax bins. The qualitative findings are similar for the two comparison
groups and consistent with the conceptual model: there is a large hole in the
bins below e10 and large excess bunching just above e10. The amount of excess
bunching between e10-e25 (scaled by the average density in the comparison
group below the notch) is shown by the estimate b, with bootstrapped standard
errors as in Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013). When comparing
to the tax simplification treatment in Panel C, we have b = 0.42: the excess mass
above the notch is 42 percent of the average density in the comparison group below
the notch. When comparing to the zero audit probability treatment in Panel D,
the effects are even stronger: the excess mass above the notch is 62 percent
of the average density in the comparison group. These bunching estimates are
highly significant, much more so than the uniform audit probability treatments
considered above (and in the previous literature). That is, randomizing a notched
audit probability vastly increases power compared to conventional randomizations
of uniform audit probabilities.
Table A7 digs deeper by comparing both the notched audit probability treat-
ment (with p = 0.5 below a cutoff) and the T6 uniform audit probability treat-
ment (with p = 0.5 everywhere) to the T3 misperception treatment (with p = 0).
To begin with, Column (1a) considers the total average treatment effect of the
notched and uniform audit probabilities. The effects are roughly similar in size
(slightly larger for the notch) and highly significant for both treatments. However,
the audit notch estimate obtained this way is attenuated, because it does not ac-
count for the fact that individuals initially above the cutoff (where p remains zero)
are untreated. Hence, Column (1b) uses the bunching estimate in Figure 2D to
obtain the correct local average treatment effect on tax payments. The estimated
audit notch impact of 45 percent constitutes the correct comparison with the
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uniform audit probability impact of 29 percent, and so the notched audit-threat
letter induces a much stronger response than the uniform audit-threat letter.
Compliance Rewards. — We complete our analysis by using the rewards/recognition
treatments to probe motivations for tax compliance. We first pool together all
such rewards treatments (T8-T11), and then later consider the individual impacts
of each type of reward (social recognition, monetary prize draws, and a combina-
tion of the two). The comparison group is the T2 Tax Simplification treatment.
As discussed earlier, the probability of actually winning each reward is very close
to zero. We therefore view the salient feature of these rewards as being what they
signal about the institution of the local church tax system. In particular, the
offer of rewards for compliance (in contrast to punishment for non-compliance)
highlights the voluntary aspect of an unenforced tax system, which may have very
different effects across different compliance types.
Panel D of Table 2 presents our findings. For the full sample, we show in
Columns (1)-(4) that the offer of compliance rewards has no significant impact
on either the extensive or total response margins of tax compliance. However,
the remaining columns show that pooling taxpayers masks the considerable het-
erogeneity in compliance responses to rewards across taxpayer types. Among
baseline evaders (the extrinsically motivated) the offer of rewards/recognition for
compliance causes them to: (i) significantly increase their probability of evading
by 1.27 percent; (ii) significantly reduces the likelihood they increase payments by
16 percent. Among baseline donors (the intrinsically motivated) the offer of re-
wards/recognition: (i) does not significantly impact their probability of donating;
(ii) significantly increases the likelihood they increase the size of their donation.
This is remarkable given the considerable levels of donation/overpayment among
this type of taxpayer at baseline.22
Two further points are of note. First, the sharply heterogeneous effects of
rewards across taxpayer types again highlights the importance of being able to
cleanly classify individuals as extrinsically or intrinsically motivated for the study
of tax compliance. Pooling all taxpayers leads to the (incomplete) conclusion that
the provision of rewards does not impact tax compliance. Second, by highlighting
the voluntary aspect of an unenforced tax system, the reward treatments induce
qualitatively similar responses among baseline evaders as the misperception treat-
ment that made explicit p = 0 and thus also emphasized that tax payments are
effectively voluntary. Baseline donors, on the other hand, respond as if these
rewards positively shock their warm glow and thus crowds-in their intrinsic mo-
tivations.
In Table 3 we report the separate impacts of each form of reward. Recall that
22The spirit of these results match findings from other contexts in which very low-value rewards
motivate prosocial behavior. For example, Stutzer, Goette and Zehnder (2011) find that offering lottery
tickets increases blood donations; Chetty, Saez and Sandor (2014) find that offering a $100 gift card to
journal referees significantly reduces the time taken to send reports.
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these rewards are of three types: (i) T8: provides individuals with a purely social
reward through the possibility of their name being publicly announced in a local
newspaper; (ii) T9-T10: provide individuals a purely private reward through their
entry into small/high valued monetary prize draws; (iii) T11: combined social
and private rewards so taxpayers have the opportunity to be recognized in a
local newspaper and be entered in the high valued monetary prize draw. Hence
the differences between these treatments are whether the reward takes the form
of social or private recognition and the value of the private reward. All other
dimensions are held constant across rewards: the number of individuals named in
the social recognition component of T8 and T11 remains the same; and in T9-
T11 the identity of monetary prize winners and their prize value remains private
information.
Panel B of Table 3 documents a very uniform pattern of impacts across the
different forms of reward, although we sometimes lose statistical significance when
focusing on individual reward treatments. Across all three samples, the sign of the
treatment effect is almost always the same for each of the individual rewards and
for the pooled effect. For example, when considering the probability of increasing
tax payments as our outcome, all four reward letters have a negative effect on the
extrinsically motivated and a positive effect on the intrinsically motivated.
Our findings thus highlight that the offer of rewards can significantly impact
tax compliance: the first-order impact will depend on taxpayers’ underlying mo-
tivations; the form in which rewards are offered are less consequential in our
setting.23 The heterogeneous treatment responses across taxpayer types reveals
a subtle trade-off for a social planner. The net benefit of offering such rewards
depends both on the magnitude of responses for extrinsically and intrinsically
motivated taxpayers, and on the underlying distribution of those types in the
population. This is a timely insight given the use of rewards or recognition for
tax compliance is becoming more prevalent, especially in developing countries.
Moreover, over half of US states have utilized ‘name and shame’ programs reveal-
ing top debtors (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
These results also shed more light on the potential crowd-out/in between ex-
trinsic and intrinsic motivations. We earlier documented that the manipulation of
deterrence parameters (extrinsic incentives) had little impact on the intrinsically
motivated, consistent with the absence of strong cross-effects between forms of
motivation. Our results on the provision of compliance rewards are consistent
with this insight: the qualitative similarity of responses to social and monetary
rewards, as well as their interaction, suggests that intrinsically motivated tax
compliance is not crowded-out by the provision of monetary rewards.24
23As such, there is little value added in discussing further the interpretation of the different types
of reward. It remains an open question for future research whether social and private recognition can
have different effects on tax compliance in other settings, say because social rewards leverage against
intrinsically motivated individuals contributing to the tax because they have social image concerns or a
desire to signal to others their type or conspicuous generosity (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006, Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2011).
24Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel (2011) review the field evidence on extrinsic-intrinsic crowd-out. Studies
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V. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the large literature on tax compliance, and specifically
to an emerging literature on intrinsic motivations for compliance (Luttmer and
Singhal, 2014). We provide novel insights on the relative importance of extrinsic
and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in a large representative sample of
German taxpayers. We shed light on each motivation and their interaction using
experimental manipulations of deterrence, tax simplification, misperception, and
rewards/recognition.
We make headway on these questions by exploiting unique aspects of our data
and setting. Our data allows us to precisely measure tax compliance in contrast
to many earlier studies (Slemrod and Weber, 2012), and to cleanly identify extrin-
sically and intrinsically motivated taxpayers based on their pre-treatment compli-
ance behavior in a zero deterrence baseline. Furthermore, the tax system studied
is one in which overpayments are encouraged, thus creating the coexistence of
evaders and donors and allowing us to integrate the study of tax compliance with
the study of charitable giving. While these topics have largely been studied sep-
arately, they naturally belong together as any imperfectly enforced tax system
involves an element of voluntary giving.
We conclude by highlighting two directions for future research. First, our find-
ing that 20 percent of individuals pay at least true taxes owed in a baseline with
no pecuniary incentive to comply suggests a need for more research that identify
the key intrinsic or social motivations to comply and study how these respond
to policy.25 We have provided evidence that duty-to-comply motives may be one
important mechanism in the context of taxation, but we have also shown that
other forms of intrinsic motives play a role—and are affected by policies that
provide recognition—for a subset of taxpayers who are willing to pay taxes above
and beyond the letter of the law.
Second, while we find significant effects of deterrence and reward incentives on
compliance behavior, the effect of these marginal incentives are relatively modest
compared to the baseline evasion rate of 80 percent. When pooling the effect of
all of our incentive treatments, we find that collectively they reduce the aggregate
evasion rate by only about 4pp. In contrast, previous work has shown that third-
party information reporting and tax withholding is able to reduce evasion to
almost zero (Kleven et al., 2011). Hence, while incentives on the margin do
matter, this paper along with the recent literature show that it is not possible to
make a tax system fully successful without information and tax collection systems
that make compliance more or less automatic. The next generation of compliance
that find no such cross-effects (in a variety of non-tax contexts) include Dal Bo´, Finan and Rossi (2013),
Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack (2014), and Chetty, Saez and Sandor (2014).
25It is instructive to compare the levels of intrinsic motivation we document to those in DellaVigna,
List and Malmendier (2012): they combine a natural field experiment and a structural model to estimate
the share of potential donors to a charitable cause that are intrinsically motivated. Despite their very
different setting, they report a quantitatively similar share of individuals who are intrinsically motivated
to give (25 percent) as we find in our zero deterrence baseline.
24 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
studies should therefore provide more direct comparisons between the impact of
marginal incentives—be they economic or social in nature—and the impact of
mechanisms related to informational and administrative procedures. The longer-
term aim would be to unify separate strands of the recent economics literature,
which have identified the importance of institutional/administrative features for
individual behavior in contexts as diverse as pro-social behavior, benefits take-up,
savings, and voting.
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Figure 1. Compliance Distribution Under Zero Deterrence
A: Bunching at Exact Compliance (Duty-to-Comply)
Control Letter
B: Duty-to-Comply vs. Attention
Simplification Letter – Control Letter
Note: Panel A displays the raw distributions of the difference between payment made and payment owed
for the control letter. In panel A, the sample consists of compliers and donors with strictly positive
payments. Panel B plots differences in the densities of tax payments made - tax payments owed between
different treatment groups. The objective is to see if bunching at exact compliance (demarcated by the
vertical line at zero) responds to the tax simplification treatment. Hence, Panel B shows the difference
between the T2 simplification group and the T1 control group. In Panel B the sample consists of all
individuals. The bin size in both panels is 5 Euro.
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Figure 2. Effect of Audit Probability Notch on Compliance
A: Densities in Audit Notch Treatment and in
Control Group (Theoretical Illustration)
B: Difference in Densities Between Audit Notch
Treatment and Control Group (Theoretical Illus-
tration)
Figure 2: Effect of Audit Probability Notch on Compliance
Notes: Panel A provides a graphical illustration of the distribution of payments made expected for the audit probability notch treatment (compared to the distribution of payments in the control group). Panel B graphically illustrates the expected difference in densities
between the audit probability notch treatment and the control group. Panels C and D display the difference in the empirical density distributions of payments made. The density distribution of the audit probability notch letter group is compared to the density distribution
of the simplification letter group in panel C and to the density distribution of the zero audit probability letter group in panel D. In both lower panels, the dashed horizontal line denotes zero difference in density distributions between the compared letter groups. The
vertical line denotes the threshold at which the audit probability dips from 50% (payments below) to 0% (payments above). Bunching b is the excess mass just above the threshold (scaled by the average counterfactual density below the notch). In both panels, the
sample consists of baseline evaders, who paid less than the amount owed prior to treatment (baseline year 2011). The sample is limited to those with payments weakly smaller than 150 Euro. The bin size is 5 Euro. We account for differences in the size of tax
brackets below and above the threshold by averaging densities within tax brackets.
Summary: Both Panels C and D show that individuals receiving the audit probability notch letter are less likely to pay amounts subject to a positive audit probability but instead move to the payment bin just above the threshold. Excess bunching is .42 the height of the
counterfactual distribution in Panel C and .62 the height of the counterfactual distribution in Panel D. Both estimates are strongly significant.
C: Effect of Audit Notch Treatment Compared to Simplification Letter
(Audit Probability Notch - Simplification Letter)
D: Effect of Audit Notch Treatment Compared to Zero Audit Probability Letter
(Audit Probability Notch - Zero Audit Probability Letter)
A: Densities in Audit Notch Treatment and in Control Group 
(Graphical Illustration)
B: Difference in Densities between Audit Notch Treatment and Control Group 
(Graphical Illustration)
Density in control group
Density in audit notch 
treatment group
Payment
Density
10 €
Difference 
in density
Difference in densities 
between audit notch 
treatment and control 
group
Payment
0
10 €
Figure 2: Effect of Audit Probability Notch o  Compliance
Notes: Panel A provides a graphical illustration of the distribution of payments made expected for the audit probability notch treatment (compared to the distribution of payments in the control group). Panel B graphically illustrates the expected difference in densities
between the audit probability notch treatment and the control group. Panels C and D display the difference in the empirical density distributions of payments made. The density distribution of the audit probability notch letter group is compared to the density distribution
of the simplification letter group in panel C and to the density distribution of the zero audit probability letter group in panel D. In both lower panels, the dashed horizontal line denotes zero difference in density distributions between the compared letter groups. The
vertical line denotes the threshold at which the audit probability dips from 50% (payments below) to 0% (payments above). Bunching b is the excess mass just above the threshold (scaled by the average counterfactual density below the notch). In both panels, the
sample consists of baseline evaders, who paid less than the amount owed prior to treatment (baseline year 2011). The sample is limited to those with payments weakly smaller than 150 Euro. The bin size is 5 Euro. We account for differences in the size of tax
brackets below and above the threshold by averaging densities within tax brackets.
Summary: Both Panels C and D show that individuals receiving the audit probability notch letter are less likely to pay amounts subject to a positive audit probability but instead move to the payment bin just above the threshold. Excess bunching is .42 the height of the
counterfactual distribution in Panel C and .62 the height of the counterfactual distribution in Panel D. Both estimates are strongly significant.
C: Effect of Audit Notch Treatment Compared to Simplification Letter
(Audit Probability Notch - Simplification Letter)
D: Effect of Audit Notch Treatment Compared to Zero Audit Probability Letter
(Audit Probability Notch - Zero Audit Probability Letter)
A: Densities in Audit Notch Treatment and in Control Group 
(Graphical Illustration)
B: Diff rence in Densities between Audit Notch Treatment and Control Group 
(Graphical Illustration)
Density in control group
Density in audit notch 
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C: Effect of Audit Notch Treatment Compared to
Simplification Letter (Audit Probability Notch –
Simplification Letter)
D: Effect of Audit Notch Treatment Compared to
Zero Audit Probability Letter (Audit Probability
Notch - Zero Audit Probability Letter)
Note: Panel A provides a theoretical illustration of the distribution of payments made for the audit
probability notch treatment (compared to the distribution of payments in the control group). Similarly,
Panel B illustrates the difference in densities between the audit probability notch treatment and the
control group. Panels C and D display the difference in the empirical density distributions of payments
made. The density distribution of the audit probability notch letter group is compared to the density
distribution of the simplification letter group in panel C and to the density distribution of the zero audit
probability letter group in panel D. In both lower panels, the dashed horizontal line denotes zero difference
in density distributions between the compared letter groups. The vertical line denotes the threshold at
which the audit probability dips from 50 percent (payments below) to zero percent (payments above).
Bunching b is the excess mass just above the threshold (scaled by the average counterfactual density
below the notch). In both panels, the sample consists of baseline evaders, who paid less than the amount
owed prior to treatment (baseline year 2011). The sample is limited to those with payments weakly
smaller than 150 Euro. The bin size is 5 Euro. We account for differences in the size of tax brackets
below and above the threshold by averaging densities within tax brackets.
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Table 1—Compliance Under Zero Deterrence
Control Group, Means
Full Sample Evaders Compliers/Donors
(Extrinsically Motivated) (Intrinsically Motivated)
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Individuals 2532 2004 528
Percentage of All Individuals 100% 79.1% 20.9%
Full Evaders 72.7% 91.9% -
Partial Evaders 6.4% 8.08% -
Compliers 11.6% - 55.5%
Donors 9.3% - 44.5%
Payment Amount e10.32 e1.87 e42.40
Note: The sample of individuals are all those assigned to the T1 Control Group in 2012 (2532 individuals).
The Column headings refer to behavior in 2012, the year of the field experiment. Evaders are defined as
those who pay strictly less than their legal tax liability, compliers are those who pay exactly their legal
tax liability, and donors are those who pay strictly more than their legal tax liability.
Table 2—Treatment Effects on Compliance - Part I
Full Sample
Probability Probability Payment Probability
of Evading of Donating Amount of Payment
Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Tax Simplification
Simplification vs Control
Effect of Tax Simplification −2.45∗∗ −0.438 9.73∗∗∗ 33.61∗∗∗
(0.971) (6.90) (3.73) (10.25)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group 79.29% 9.24% e10.29 7.89%
Number of Observations 5076 5076 5076 5076
Panel B: Misperception
Zero Audit Probability vs Simplification
Effect of Correcting Misperception 0.942 −7.23 −0.766 −10.60
(0.889) (5.65) (3.05) (6.75)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group 77.30% 9.75% e11.65 10.92%
Number of Observations 7641 7641 7641 7641
Panel C: Deterrence
Positive Audit Probability vs Zero Audit Probability
Effect of Deterrence −3.13∗∗∗ 13.71∗∗∗ 10.45∗∗∗ 26.93∗∗∗
(0.660) (4.59) (2.37) (5.84)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group 78.04% 8.93% e11.63 9.42%
Number of Observations 12692 12692 12692 12692
Panel D: Compliance Rewards
Reward vs Simplification
Effect of Compliance Rewards 0.259 −0.040 1.24 −9.48
(0.821) (5.23) (2.86) (6.21)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group 77.30% 9.75% e11.65 10.92%
Number of Observations 12632 12632 12632 12632
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Table 3—Individual Treatment Effects on Compliance - Part I
Full Sample
Probability Probability Payment Probability
of Evading of Donating Amount of Payment
Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Deterrence
Positive Audit Probability vs Zero Audit Probability
Deterrence, Pooled Effect −2.45∗∗ −0.438 9.73∗∗∗ 33.61∗∗∗
(0.971) (6.90) (3.73) (10.25)
Deterrence, Individual Effects
Audit probability = 0.1 −3.29∗∗∗ 5.38 9.52∗∗∗ 29.76∗∗∗
(0.898) (6.08) (3.20) (8.05)
Audit probability = 0.2 −3.11∗∗∗ 17.61∗∗∗ 11.48∗∗∗ 26.81∗∗∗
(0.923) (6.44) (3.37) (8.11)
Audit probability = 0.5 −2.99∗∗∗ 18.27∗∗∗ 10.38∗∗∗ 24.17∗∗∗
(0.912) (6.31) (3.30) (8.01)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group 78.04% 8.93% e11.63 9.42%
Number of Observations 12692 12692 12692 12692
Panel B: Compliance Rewards
Reward vs Simplification
Compliance Rewards, Pooled Effect 0.259 −0.040 1.24 −9.48
(0.821) (5.23) (2.86) (6.21)
Compliance Rewards, Individual Effects
Social reward 0.185 2.97 0.245 −11.60
(1.03) (6.68) (3.51) (7.71)
Small private reward 0.450 −4.59 −1.15 −10.88
(1.03) (6.74) (3.56) (7.74)
Large private reward 1.02 −3.30 2.12 −15.30∗∗
(1.00) (6.60) (3.98) (7.63)
Social and private reward combined −0.618 4.75 3.74 −0.15
(1.04) (6.57) (3.73) (7.89)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group 77.30% 9.75% e11.65 10.92%
Number of Observations 12632 12632 12632 12632
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A.1 Propositions on Extensive and Intensive Compliance Responses
The extensive margin decision of evading, complying or donating is characterized as follows:
Proposition 1 (Extensive Margin) Assuming smooth preferences, there exists cutoffs s¯1, s¯2
such that a fraction F (s¯1) of the population are evaders (z < z¯), a fraction F (s¯2) − F (s¯1) are
compliers (z = z¯), and a fraction 1− F (s¯2) are donors (z > z¯). The cutoffs are given by,
u′T (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯1)
u′c (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯1)
= 1− p [1 + θ] and u
′
T (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯2)
u′c (z¯ − T (z¯) , T (z¯) , s¯2)
= 1,
implying s¯1 < s¯2 and therefore excess bunching at z = z¯ for any positive deterrence incentive,
p [1 + θ] > 0. We have:
(A) Deterrence: stronger deterrence (larger p or θ) reduces s¯1 and does not affect s¯2. Hence,
the fraction of evaders is decreasing, the fraction of compliers is increasing, and the fraction of
donors is unaffected by deterrence.
(B) Warm Glow: stronger warm-glow (larger u′T all else equal) reduces both s¯1 and s¯2. Hence,
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the fraction of evaders is decreasing, the fraction of compliers is indeterminate, and the fraction
of donors is increasing in warm glow.
Proof: This follows from (2) and the fact that u′T/u
′
c is increasing in s. We also use that there is
a convex kink at z = z¯ as the marginal deterrence incentive falls discretely from p [1 + θ] to 0. 
We then turn to the intensive margin decision within each group. For this purpose, it is helpful
to state the following (natural) assumption on preferences:
Assumption 1 The MRS between consumption in the audited and non-audited states u′cA/u
′
cN
and the MRS between warm glow and consumption E [u′T ] /u
′
cN
are both decreasing in T (z).
This assumption is consistent with, but stronger than, concavity of the utility function (u′′cc, u
′′
TT <
0). That is, while concavity by itself creates the effect in Assumption 1, there could be an offsetting
effect under either substitutability (u′′cT < 0) or complementarity (u
′′
cT > 0) between extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations. For example, while higher tax payments directly reduce u′cA/u
′
cN
by moving
consumption from the non-audited to the audited state, the larger warm-glow benefits will have an
indirect effect on u′cA/u
′
cN
provided that u′′cT/u
′
c is different between the two states (which depends
on a third-order derivative of the utility function). Assumption 1 rules out situations where the
indirect effect goes against the direct effect and is strong enough to overturn it.1
With this assumption, we are able to state the following result on the intensive margin:
Proposition 2 (Intensive Margin) Under Assumption 1, we have:
(A) Deterrence: stronger deterrence (larger p or θ) increases reported income z for evaders
(s < s¯1), while it does not affect reported income z for donors (s > s¯2).
(B) Warm Glow: stronger warm-glow (larger u′T all else equal) increases reported income z for
both evaders and donors (s < s¯1 and s > s¯2, respectively).
Proof: The evader results follow from (2) for I {z ≤ z¯} = 1 and Assumption 1. The donor
results follow from (2) for I {z ≤ z¯} = 0 in which case u′cN = u′cA = u′c (z¯ − T (z) , T (z) , s) and
E [u′T ] = u
′
T (z¯ − T (z) , T (z) , s). 
A.2 Attrition
To investigate the correlates of attrition from our panel data, we estimate a linear probability model
that has a dependent variable equal to one if the individual is in our sample in year 2008, and has
1Formally, for the MRS between consumption in the audited and non-audited states u′cA/u
′
cN , the effect of T (z)
coming through warm glow (holding consumption cA, cN fixed) is given by
∂
∂T
u′cA
u′cN
∣∣∣∣
cA,cN
=
[
u′′cAT
u′cA
− u
′′
cNT
u′cN
]
u′cA
u′cN
,
where u′′cAT ≡ u′′cT (cA, T (z) , s) and u′′cNT ≡ u′′cT (cN , T (z) , s). Assumption 1 implies that this effect (which depends
on u′′′cTc) cannot be so strongly positive that it dominates the direct negative effect coming through diminishing
marginal returns to consumption.
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attritted by 2012, the year of the field experiment. This analysis is based on the 31, 238 individuals
observed in 2008: 86.5% are observed in all years 2008-12. We are primarily interested in how
attrition is correlated to treatment assignment, and whether there is evidence of heterogeneous
attrition across treatments. The most important form of individual heterogeneity considered in
our analysis is whether the individual is a baseline evader, complier or donor. Hence we control
throughout for this individual type, as defined based on observed behavior in 2008.
Column 1 of Table A3 shows that those that evade in 2008 are 2.4 percentage points more
likely to attrit by the 2012 tax year than exact compliers in 2008, an effect significant at the 1%
level; 2008 donors are not significantly more or less likely to attrit than 2008 exact compliers.
This correlation between non-compliance and attrition is intuitive: if past compliance behavior
reflects baseline motivation, then non-compliance should be a predictor of opting-out in later
years. Column 2 shows this to be robust to including individual controls and parish fixed effects.2
Column 3 additionally controls for the treatment assignment dummies. An F-test of their joint
significance does not reject the null [p-value 0.872]. Hence we find no evidence that individuals
are more likely to attrit because of the treatment they are assigned to. This ameliorates concerns
the field experiment caused individuals to opt-out of the Protestant church, that might have offset
any gains from compliance among those that do not attrit. Finally, Column 4 includes a complete
series of interactions between treatment assignments and the individual’s type based on their 2008
behavior (so the reported coefficients now relate to attrition in the control group). We find there
is no differential attrition across treatments by past compliance behavior: the three F-tests on
the joint significance of the treatment dummies, treatment dummy-evader 2008 interactions, and
treatment dummy-donor 2008 interactions, all do not reject the null.
A.3 Persistence in Individual Type
To provide further evidence on the degree of persistence in individual compliance behavior over
time, we use a multinomial logit model to estimate the correlates of behavior in 2011, the tax
year immediately prior to our field experiment. We do so among those individuals assigned to
our T1 Control group, and we report relative risk ratios where the omitted base category is
exact compliance in 2011. In Column 1 of Table A5 we only condition on the individuals lagged
type, namely whether they evaded or donated in the 2010. This evidence suggests a high degree
of persistence over time in individual types: For the extrinsically motivated, those that evade
in 2010 are 83.3 times as likely to evade the following year as comply. For the intrinsically
motivated, those that donate in 2010 are 10.8 times as likely to continue donating the following
year than comply. Column 2 shows this finding to be robust when we additionally control for
individual characteristics. The relevant relative risk ratio for persistence in evasion is 87.1, and
2The individual controls are whether the individual is male, their age, the number of children, whether they are
a joint filer, receive wage income, are liable for trade taxes, and their church tax payment bin.
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for persistence in donating it is 9.01. We further note that most of the individual controls do not
predict compliance behavior, and those that do have relatively small relative risk ratios compared
to the individual’s own past compliance behavior.
A.4 Social Norms and Moral Suasion
We here present more detailed evidence on our treatments related to social norms and moral
suasion. These mirror treatments implemented in Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod (2001):
while Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod (2001) found such treatments to have limited impact,
we revisit the issue by probing further whether there are heterogenous impacts across baseline
extrinsically and intrinsically motivated tax payers. Our social norms treatment, denoted T12,
provides individuals information on the average payments of those that made some strictly pos-
itive payment in the previous tax year. Table A1 shows precisely how this was communicated.3
Our moral suasion treatment emphasizes the social benefits of making a payment to the local
public good of parish services (and specifically naming the parish the individual belongs to). This
treatment is denoted T13 and the wording of the relevant paragraph is also shown in Table A1.
Table A8 presents the results following the same format as earlier, where the natural comparison
is with the T2 Tax Simplification treatment. When considering the intrinsically motivated, we
again focus on baseline donors and thus remove baseline compliers whom the evidence suggests
are largely motivated by a duty-to-comply.
When pooling all taxpayers or considering baseline evaders alone, we find both treatments have
weak impacts on behavior on both the extensive and total response margins.4 Among baseline
donors, there is some weak evidence that both treatments increase tax payments. Taken together,
these findings suggest that such forms of intervention are unlikely to induce large changes in
tax compliance, at least among the majority of taxpayers who are baseline evaders. As such, our
findings on moral suasion are in line with some of the earlier literature (Blumenthal, Christian and
Slemrod, 2001; Fellner, Sausgruber and Traxler, 2013), and confirm these non-responses uniformly
apply even when extrinsically and intrinsically motivated tax payers can be identified based on
their pre-treatment behavior. Such uniform null effects of these kinds of treatment are perhaps
not altogether surprising in the context of tax compliance: as discussed by Luttmer and Singhal
3We might expect such norms treatments to be effective if individuals are conditional cooperators, or they have
a preference for conformity. Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) overview the evidence on the effectiveness of such appeals
in various contexts related to prosocial behavior. More recently, Hallsworth et al. (2014) provide evidence from a
natural field experiment that providing information on norms and moral appeal accelerates actual payments among
UK tax payers.
4We also probed both results to further explore heterogeneous responses. Among baseline donors, we tested
whether the social norm treatment had heterogenous impacts among those that paid more or less than the stated
norm in 2011. We found no evidence that either subset of baseline donors responds to this information (not
shown). On moral suasion, we explored whether this treatment had differential impacts depending on the church
membership, or the involvement of church members in church activities, across the parishes in our data. Again, no
robust heterogeneous impacts were found.
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(2014), individual views on the value of public services provided through taxation are formed
through a lifetime of experiences, and these kinds of treatment are unlikely to be powerful enough
to induce changes in such beliefs.5
5This is of course not to suggest that appeals to social norms would not be effective in determining other forms
of prosocial behavior. For example, such social norms treatments have been found to effectively raise political
contributions (Frey and Meier, 2004). Perez-Truglia and Cruces (2014) show how this is driven by which peers
are expected to observe such contributions. Besley, Jensen and Persson (2014) present evidence from the UK
on how the short-lived switch to the politically unpopular poll tax on property, led to a short run spike in non-
compliance in property taxes and had long term impacts on compliance with property taxes even when the regime
was subsequently altered. This suggests social norms can be shifted when shocked by sufficiently large changes to
the design of the tax system.
5
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Level
1 2,37
2 26,5
3 32.0
4 16,8
5 9,43
6 12,9
Figure A1: Local Church Tax Schedule
Annual income or benefits Annual Church Tax 
% of Sample in Tax 
Bracket, 2012
€ 8,005 to € 9,999 € 5
€ 10
€ 25
€ 45
€ 70
Notes: Figure A1 shows the local church tax schedule: the x-axis shows taxable income. This is a progressive tax
schedule with six payment bins. The lower table shows the percentage of the sample in the year of the field
experiment that falls into each payment bin.
€ 10,000 to € 24,999
€ 40,000 to € 54,999
€ 55,000 to € 69,999
€ 70,000 and above € 100
€ 25,000 to € 39,999
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Outcome: Evader in 2010 Donor in 2010 Evader in 2010 Donor in 2010
Evader in 2009 Tax Year [yes=1] 83.3*** 2.16*** 87.1*** 2.02***
(16.1) (0.563) (17.5) (0.536)
Donor in 2009 Tax Year [yes=1] 2.32*** 10.8*** 2.45*** 9.01***
(0.601) (2.50) (0.672) (2.22)
Male 0.916 1.04
(0.168) (0.223)
Age 1.00 1.03***
(0.008) (0.009)
Number of Children 1.23* 0.786
(0.152) (0.117)
Joint Filer [yes=1] 0.771 1.03
(0.165) (0.234)
Wage Income  [yes=1] 1.85** 1.29
(0.539) (0.377)
Liable for Trade Tax [yes=1] 4.30*** 3.07
(2.32) (2.33)
Payment Owed = €10 [Income Bracket €10000-€25000] 1.41 0.858
(0.685) (0.434)
Payment Owed = €25 [Income Bracket €25000 - €40000] 1.47 1.30
(0.743) (0.691)
Payment Owed = €45 [Income Bracket €40000 - €55000] 1.10 1.46
(0.564) (0.837)
Payment Owed = €70 [Income Bracket €55000 - €70000] 1.70 1.24
(0.953) (0.779)
Payment Owed = €100 [Income Bracket €70000+] 1.21 0.292*
(0.646) (0.198)
Observations
Multinomial Logit Estimates, Relative Risk Ratios Reported                                                                          
(Base Category = Complier in 2010 Tax Year)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is based on individuals assigned to the T1 Control Group. The outcome
is the individual's compliance behavior on the extensive margin in 2011 (evader, complier, donor), the year preceding our natural field experiment.
The table reports a multinomial logit model. We report relative risk ratios where the omitted base category is exact compliance in 2011. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. In Column 1 we only condition on the individuals lagged type, namely whether they evaded or donated
in 2010 (where exact compliers in 2010 are the omitted category). Column 2 additionally control for the individual characteristics shown.
Table A5: Persistence of Type in Control Group
(2) Individual Controls               
2521
(1) Past Behavior                    
2521
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T1 (Control) Letter 
 
 
[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church 
administration] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            [place & date] 
Dear Ms/Mr [addressee’s family name], 
 
As every year, we kindly ask you herewith  for your annual  local church tax payment, with which you directly support the work of 
your Evangelical‐Lutheran congregation and the social work of the deaconry. The local church tax forms part of the general church 
tax and is collected once yearly by the Evangelical‐Lutheran Church in […].  
 
What do you get from the local church tax? 
Many congregations and services use the  local church tax  funds  for very elementary purposes, such as church maintenance or to 
cover heating costs. With your local church tax you help the churches to stay open and offer a home to those who need it. 
 
Be it the Baptism and Confirmation of your children, or a church wedding, we are always there when you need us. Or when tragedy 
or a crisis hits. You will always find someone who listens and provides concrete support in your congregation and at our Evangelical 
counselling centres. With your local church tax, you also support more than 60 Evangelical kindergartens that instil Christian values 
in our children and thus provide a solid basis for the development of their character.  
 
The Evangelical Church  is also engaged  in the region's social hotspots. Your  local church tax supports  important on‐going projects 
dedicated  to  the  social  reintegration of  troubled youths, keeping  them  from  sliding  into  social alienation. Your  contribution also 
helps  to  sustain 17 nursing  services  for elderly and  sick people. You  can also  find  further examples of our work  in  the enclosed 
bulletin. 
 
Why is the local church tax so important? 
The local church tax has become increasingly important for the Church District of the Evangelical‐Lutheran Church of […] because the 
grants received by the local parishes have declined over the years. 60% of the gross revenue goes to the congregations, 28% to the 
deaconry and 12% to supra‐congregational services (such as counselling centres). In 2011, the local church tax collected 1.7 million 
euros. We express our heartfelt gratitude to all those who, with their contribution, make possible the continued provision of the 
various church services in […].  
 
How much Local church tax do you have to pay? 
The  Local  church  tax  is  staggered according  to  income  and  ranges  from € 5  to € 100 annually, depending on  your own  income 
assessment. This  letter has the  legal status of a tax bill. We would therefore kindly ask that each tax bill recipient  in a household 
(e.g., husband and wife) transfer the respective amount of local church tax separately, specifying your local church tax number (cf. 
remittance slip). We apologise for any inconvenience in this regard. 
 
You will find further information on the back of this page. If you have any questions, we would be glad to answer them at our service 
hotline […] or per e‐mail at […]. We appreciate your financial support.  
 
With kind regards, 
 
[signature in handwriting] 
 
Regional Dean of the Church District 
 
 
[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter] 
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Information regarding the local church tax 
 
1. The local church tax 
is, together with the church payroll tax and the church income tax, a compulsory contribution that is collected once a year and that 
benefits  your  local  congregation  directly. All  congregation members  over  18  years of  age  receive  the  local  church  tax  payment 
notice, so that a family can receive several such notices. (For technical reasons, it is not possible to do otherwise. We apologize for 
any  inconvenience.)  The  local  church  tax  revenues  remain  in  the  Church  District  of  […]  and  are  then  allotted  to  the  local 
congregations as well as to supra‐congregational and deaconry projects in the […] district, in accordance with the guidelines set forth 
by the District Synod.  In Bavaria, the rate  for both the church payroll tax and the church  income tax  is at 8%,  lower than  in most 
other  federal states  (where  it  is 9% of  the general payroll and  income  tax).  In Bavaria, the church collects  the  local church  tax  in 
addition to the aforementioned taxes. 
 
2. The legal foundation 
for  collecting  the  local  church  tax  is  the Kirchensteuergesetz  (KirchStG) as published on November 21, 1994  (GVBI, p. 250),  last 
amended on 22 December 2008 (GVBI, p. 973) and the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of December 9, 2002 (KABI. 2003, p. 19), as 
well as by the Implementing Regulation on the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of October 15, 2003 (KABI. 2003 p. 306). You can find 
the corresponding legal texts at […]. We would also be happy to send them to you upon request.   
 
3. Subject to the local church tax 
are all members of the Evangelical‐Lutheran Congregation who, as of January 1st, fulfill all the following conditions (Article 7 para. 3 
of the Church Levy Collection Act): 
• Have turned 18 years old before January 1st of the current year 
• Had an income of more than € 8,004 (the tax‐exempt amount in accordance with Article 32a para. I No. 1 of the Income Tax Law 
[EStG]). As a general rule, this is the taxable income, but other income such as alimony or child support, benefit payments, pensions 
or regular stipends must also be considered.  
• Residence within the area of the […].  
 
4. Exempt taxation are 
• All congregants under the age of 18, 
• Congregants above the age of 18 whose income does not exceed € 8,005 (see point 3 above).  
Should any of  the conditions above apply, you can  file an objection within one month of receipt of this notification. To  this end, 
simply return the notification, together with a short explanation, to […], or send an e‐mail with an explanatory statement, including 
your local church tax number (indicated on the bank transfer form), your first and family names and your address to […]. 
 
5. The amount of local church tax 
is staggered according to  income from €5 to €100. We suggest that,  in making the self‐assessment, you take as a basis the yearly 
income used to sustain your  livelihood (see Point 3 above). We ask you to make your payment no  later than September 15, 2012. 
We thank you in advance. 
 
Tier  Yearly Income or Benefits  Annual Local Church Tax 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
 
€ 8,005 to € 9,999 
€ 10,000 to € 24,999 
€ 25,000 to € 39,999 
€ 40,000 to € 54,999 
€ 55,000 to € 69,999 
€ 70,000 and above 
€ 5 
€ 10 
€ 25 
€ 45 
€ 70 
€ 100 
 
6. Tax‐reducing expenditure 
The local church tax payment can be claimed as a deductible church tax in your tax filing. 
 
7. Donations 
Every  sum above €100  is considered a donation, which we gratefully appreciate. For donations between €100 and €300,  the  tax 
office accepts a plain certificate of donation, such as a bank transfer slip where the beneficiary institution and the intended purpose 
are shown. For donations above €300, we will automatically send you a donation certificate. 
 
8. Payment already effected 
Should you have already paid  the  local church  tax, please disregard  this notice. For  technical  reasons,  it  is not possible  for us  to 
identify payments made before the payment notice is issued and thus exempt you from receiving it.  
 
9. Further information 
is available at […] 
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 T2 (Simplification) Letter 
 
 
[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church 
administration] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            [place & date] 
 
Dear Ms/Mr [addressee’s family name], 
With this letter, we want to inform you that your annual local church tax payment is due. The local church tax forms part of 
the general church tax and is a compulsory payment that is collected once yearly by the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in 
the […] region. 
Subject to the local church tax are all members of the Evangelical-Lutheran congregation who are at least 18 years of age 
by January 1st of the current year, earned an income of more than €8,004, and who reside within the area of the Church 
District. The amount of the local church tax is staggered according to income and ranges from €5 to €100 annually, 
depending on your own income assessment. We suggest that, in making the self-assessment, you take as a basis the 
yearly income used to sustain your livelihood. As a general rule, this is your taxable income, but other sources of income 
such as alimony or child support, benefit payments, pensions or regular stipends must also be considered. 
Additional paragraph in treatments T2-T13 here 
 
 
Tier 
 
 
Yearly Income or Benefits 
 
Annual Local Church Tax 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
 
€ 8,005 to € 9,999 
€ 10,000 to € 24,999 
€ 25,000 to € 39,999 
€ 40,000 to € 54,999 
€ 55,000 to € 69,999 
€ 70,000 and above 
 
€ 5 
€ 10 
€ 25 
€ 45 
€ 70 
€ 100 
 
This letter has the legal status of a tax bill. We would therefore kindly ask that each tax bill recipient in a household (e.g., 
husband and wife) transfer the respective amount of local church tax separately, specifying your local church tax number 
(cf. remittance slip). We request that your payment be made no later than September 30, 2012. 
You will find further information on the back of this page. If you have any questions, we would be glad to answer them at 
our service hotline […] or per e-mail at […]. 
With kind regards, 
 
[signature in handwriting] 
 
Regional Dean of the Church District 
 
 
[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter] 
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Information regarding the local church tax 
1. The local church tax 
is, together with the church payroll tax and the church income tax, a compulsory contribution that is collected once a year 
and that benefits your local congregation directly. The local church tax revenues remain in the Church District of […] and 
are then allotted to the local congregations as well as to supra-congregational and deaconry projects in the […] district, in 
accordance with the guidelines set forth by the District Synod. In Bavaria, the rate for both the church payroll tax and the 
church income tax is at 8%, lower than in most other federal states (where it is 9% of the general payroll and income tax). 
In Bavaria, the church collects the local church tax in addition to the aforementioned taxes. 
 
2. The legal foundation 
for collecting the local church tax is the Kirchensteuergesetz (KirchStG) as published on November 21, 1994 (GVBI, p. 
1026), last amended on December 22, 2008 (GVBl, p. 973), and the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of December 9, 2002 
(KABI. 2010, p. 9), as well as the Implementing Regulation on the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of December 7, 2006 
(KABI. 2007 p. 18). You can find the corresponding legal texts at …]. We would also be happy to send them to you upon 
request. 
 
3. What do you get from the local church tax? 
Many congregations and services use the local church tax funds for very elementary purposes, such as church 
maintenance or to cover heating costs. With your local church tax, you help the churches to stay open and to offer a home 
to those who need it. With your local church tax, you also support more than 60 Evangelical kindergartens that instil 
Christian values in our children and thus provide a solid basis for the development of their character.  
The Evangelical Church is also engaged in the region's social hotspots. Your local church tax supports important on-going 
projects dedicated to the social reintegration of troubled youths, keeping them from sliding into social alienation. Your 
contribution also helps to sustain 17 nursing services for elderly and sick people. You can also find further examples of 
our work in the enclosed bulletin. 
4. Why is the local church tax so important? 
The local church tax has become increasingly important for the Church District of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of […] 
because the grants received by the local parishes have declined over the years. 60% of the gross revenue goes to the 
congregations, 28% to the deaconry and 12% to supra-congregational services (such as counselling centres). In 2011, 
the local church tax collected 1.7 million Euros. 
5. Exempt from taxation are 
• all congregants under the age of 18, 
• congregants above the age of 18 whose income does not exceed € 8,005. 
Should any of the conditions above apply, you can file an objection within one month of the receipt of this notification. To 
this end, simply return the notification, together with a short explanation, to the Church District of […], or send an e-mail 
with an explanatory statement, including your local church tax number (indicated on the bank transfer form), your first and 
family names and your address to […]. 
6. Tax-reducing expenditure 
The local church tax payment can be claimed as a deductible church tax in your tax filing. 
 
7. Donations 
Every sum above €100 is considered a donation, which we gratefully appreciate. For donations between €100 and €300, 
the tax office accepts a plain certificate of donation, such as a bank transfer slip where the beneficiary institution and the 
intended purpose are shown. For donations above €300, we will automatically send you a donation certificate. 
8. Payment already effected 
Should you have already paid the local church tax, please disregard this notice. For technical reasons, it is not possible 
for us to identify payments made before the payment notice is issued and thus exempt you from receiving it.  
 
9. Further Information 
is available at […] 
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 T1 (Control) Letter in German 
 
 
[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church 
administration] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            [place & date] 
Sehr geehrte/r Frau/Herr [Nachname], 
mit  diesem  Brief  bitten  wir  Sie  auch  dieses  Jahr  um  Ihr  Kirchgeld,  mit  dem  Sie  direkt  die  Arbeit  Ihrer  Gemeinde  und  die 
sozialdiakonischen Dienste der evangelischen Kirche unterstützen. Das Kirchgeld  ist ein Teil der Kirchensteuer, der einmal  im  Jahr 
von der Evangelisch‐Lutherischen Kirche in der Region […] erhoben wird. 
 
Was haben Sie vom Kirchgeld? 
Viele Gemeinden und Dienste verwenden das Kirchgeld  für ganz elementare Dinge wie die  Instandhaltung  ihrer Kirchen oder  für 
Heizkosten. Mit dem Kirchgeld tragen Sie dazu bei, dass die Kirchen offen sind und den Menschen ein Zuhause bieten. 
 
Ob bei der Taufe und Konfirmation Ihres Kindes oder bei Trauungen: Wir sind für Sie da, wenn Sie uns brauchen. Auch im Trauerfall 
und  in Krisenzeiten  stehen wir  Ihnen bei.  In  Ihrer Gemeinde und unseren  evangelischen Beratungsstellen  finden  Sie Gehör und 
konkrete  Hilfestellungen.  Mit  dem  Kirchgeld  unterstützen  wir  auch  über  60  evangelische  Kindergärten,  die  unseren  Kindern 
christliche Werte vermitteln und so zu einer stabilen Basis ihrer Persönlichkeit beitragen. 
 
Die  evangelische  Kirche  kümmert  sich  zudem  um  die  sozialen  Brennpunkte  in  der  Region. Mit  dem  Kirchgeld  können wichtige 
Projekte  im Rahmen der  Jugendsozialarbeit zur Resozialisierung von  Jugendlichen weitergeführt werden. Wir verhindern so, dass 
junge Menschen ins soziale Abseits geraten. Darüber hinaus unterstützen Sie mit Ihrem Beitrag beispielsweise 17 Pflegedienste für 
alte und kranke Menschen. Konkrete Beispiele unserer Arbeit finden Sie auch in der beigefügten Mitgliederzeitung. 
 
Warum ist das Kirchgeld so wichtig? 
Das  Kirchgeld  gewinnt  für  die  […]  zunehmend  an  Bedeutung,  weil  die  Zuweisungen  der  Landeskirche  an  die  Gemeinden 
zurückgegangen  sind. 60 % des Reinertrags gehen an die Gemeinden, 28 % an die Diakonie und 12 % an die übergemeindlichen 
Dienste (z.B. Beratungsstellen).  Im Jahr 2011 wurden 1,7 Millionen Euro Kirchgeld eingezahlt. Herzlichen Dank sagen wir allen, die 
mit ihrem Beitrag die vielfältigen Angebote der evangelischen Kirche in der Region […] ermöglicht haben. 
 
Wie hoch ist der Kirchgeldbeitrag? 
Der Pflichtbeitrag Kirchgeld ist nach Einkommen gestaffelt und beträgt einmal jährlich entsprechend Ihrer Selbsteinstufung 5 bis 100 
Euro. Da der Kirchgeldbrief ein Steuerbescheid ist, bitten wir Sie, den entsprechenden Betrag für jeden Bescheid gesondert (z.B. Herr 
und Frau) und mit Angabe der Kirchgeldnummer (siehe Überweisungsformular) zu überweisen. Vielen Dank für Ihr Verständnis. 
 
Weitere Hinweise finden Sie auf der Rückseite. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich gerne an unser Servicetelefon […] oder schreiben Sie eine 
E‐Mail an […]. Wir bitten Sie um Ihre finanzielle Unterstützung. 
 
Mit herzlichen Grüßen 
 
Ihre 
 
[signature in handwriting] 
 
Stadtdekanin 
 
 
 
[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter] 
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 Informationen zum Kirchgeld 
 
1. Das Kirchgeld 
ist  neben  der  Kirchenlohn‐  und  Kircheneinkommensteuer  ein  Pflichtbeitrag,  der  einmal  jährlich  erhoben  wird  und  direkt  Ihrer 
Kirchengemeinde vor Ort zu Gute kommt. Alle Kirchenmitglieder über 18  Jahren erhalten den Kirchgeldbrief, so dass eine Familie 
mehrere Briefe erhalten kann.  (Aus technischen Gründen  ist das nicht anders möglich. Wir bitten um Verständnis.) Das Kirchgeld 
verbleibt  in  […], die  den  Ertrag nach den Vorgaben der Dekanatssynode  an die Kirchengemeinden  sowie  übergemeindliche und 
diakonische Projekte im Dekanatsbezirk […] verteilt. In Bayern liegt der Hebesatz für die Kirchenlohn‐ bzw. Kircheneinkommensteuer 
mit 8 % niedriger als  in den meisten anderen Bundesländern  (dort 9 % von der Lohn‐ und Einkommensteuer).  In Bayern gibt es 
zusätzlich das Kirchgeld. 
 
2. Gesetzliche Grundlage 
für  die  Erhebung  des  Kirchgeldes  ist  das  staatliche  Kirchensteuergesetz  (KirchStG)  in  der  Fassung  der  Bekanntmachung  vom 
21.11.1994  (GVBl. S. 1026),  zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22.12.2008  (GVBl. S. 973) und das Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz 
vom 09.12.2002  (KABl. 2003, S. 19) sowie die Ausführungsverordnung  zum Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz vom 15.10.2003  (KABl. 
2003 S. 306). Sie finden die entsprechenden Gesetzestexte im Internet unter […]. Wir sind auch gerne bereit, sie Ihnen zuzusenden. 
 
3. Kirchgeldpflichtig 
sind evangelisch‐lutherische Gemeindeglieder, die am 1. Januar alle folgenden Voraussetzungen erfüllen 
(§ 7 Abs.3 KirchensteuererhebungsGesetz) 
• Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres vor dem 1. Januar des laufenden Jahres 
• Jährlich mehr als 8.004 € eigene Einkünfte (Grundfreibetrag gemäß §32a Abs.1 Satz 2 Nr.1 EStG) , in der 
• Regel das zu versteuernde Einkommen. Zu berücksichtigen sind aber auch andere Bezüge zur Bestreitung 
• des Lebensunterhalts wie Unterhaltsleistungen, Versorgungsbezüge, Renten oder regelmäßige Stipendien. 
• Wohnsitz im Bereich der […] 
 
4. Befreit vom Kirchgeld sind 
• Alle Gemeindeglieder unter 18 Jahren 
• Gemeindeglieder über 18 Jahre, wenn ihre jährlichen Einkünfte (s. Punkt 3) unter 8.005 € liegen. 
Sollte einer dieser Punkte auf Sie zutreffen, können Sie innerhalb eines Monats Einspruch einlegen. Dazu schicken Sie einfach diesen 
Brief mit einer kurzen Begründung zurück an die Evangelisch‐Lutherische […], […], oder eine entsprechende E‐Mail mit Angabe Ihrer 
Kirchgeldnummer (s. Überweisungsträger), Ihrem Vor‐ und Nachnamen und Ihrer Anschrift an […]. 
 
5. Die Höhe des Kirchgelds 
ist nach dem Einkommen gestaffelt zwischen 5 € und 100 €. Wir empfehlen, bei  Ihrer Selbsteinschätzung  Ihre  jährlichen Einkünfte 
zur Bestreitung des Lebensunterhalts  (s. Punkt 3) zu Grunde zu  legen. Wir erbitten  Ihre Kirchgeldzahlung bis zum 30.09.2012 und 
bedanken uns im Voraus. 
 
Stufe  Jährliche Einkünfte oder Bezüge  Jährliches Kirchgeld 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
    8.005 bis   9.999 € 
10.000 bis 24.999 € 
25.000 bis 39.999 € 
40.000 bis 54.999 € 
55.000 bis 69.999 € 
70.000 € und mehr 
    5 €
  10 € 
  25 € 
  45 € 
  70 € 
100 € 
 
6. Steuermindernde Sonderausgabe 
Die Kirchgeldzahlung können Sie bei Ihrer Steuererklärung als Kirchensteuer geltend machen. 
 
7. Spenden 
Jeder Betrag, der die Höchstgrenze von 100 € übersteigt, gilt als Spende (Zuwendung), für die wir herzlich danken. Bei Zahlung eines 
Betrages  zwischen  100  €  und  300  €  gilt  der  vereinfachte  Zuwendungsnachweis.  Hier  genügt  die    Buchungsbestätigung  des 
Kreditinstitutes für das Finanzamt, wenn daraus die begünstigte Körperschaft und der Zweck ersichtlich sind. Bei Zahlung über 300 € 
erhalten Sie von uns automatisch eine Zuwendungsbescheinigung. 
 
8. Bereits erfolgte Zahlung 
Sollten  Sie das Kirchgeld bereits  gezahlt haben, betrachten  Sie diese Kirchgeldaufforderung  als  gegenstandslos. Aus  technischen 
Gründen  ist es uns nicht möglich, eine bereits vor der Kirchgeldaufforderung getätigte Zahlung  für das Jahr 2012 zu erfassen und 
damit zu verhindern, dass Sie einen Kirchgeldbrief erhalten. 
 
9. Weitere Informationen 
finden Sie im Internet unter […] 
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 T2 (Simplification) Letter in German 
 
 
[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church 
administration] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            [place & date] 
Sehr geehrte/r Frau/Herr [Nachname], 
mit diesem Brief möchten wir Sie darüber informieren, dass Ihre diesjährige Kirchgeldzahlung fällig ist. Das Kirchgeld ist ein Teil 
der Kirchensteuer und damit ein Pflichtbeitrag, der einmal  im Jahr von der Evangelisch‐Lutherischen Kirche  in der Region […] 
erhoben wird. 
Kirchgeldpflichtig sind alle evangelisch‐lutherischen Gemeindeglieder, die am 1. Januar des laufenden Jahres das 18. Lebensjahr 
vollendet haben, deren eigene Einkünfte den Betrag von 8.004 Euro übersteigen und deren Wohnsitz im Bereich der […] liegt. 
Die  Höhe  des  zu  zahlenden  Kirchgeldes  ist  nach  Einkommen  gestaffelt  und  beträgt  einmal  jährlich  entsprechend  Ihrer 
Selbsteinstufung  5  bis  100  Euro. Wir  empfehlen,  bei  Ihrer  Selbsteinschätzung  Ihre  jährlichen  Einkünfte  zur Bestreitung  des 
Lebensunterhalts zu Grunde zu  legen.  In der Regel entsprechen diese dem zu versteuernden Einkommen. Zu berücksichtigen 
sind aber auch andere Bezüge zur Bestreitung des Lebensunterhalts wie Unterhaltsleistungen, Versorgungsbezüge, Renten oder 
regelmäßige Stipendien. 
Additional paragraph in treatments T2‐T13 here 
 
Stufe  Jährliche Einkünfte oder Bezüge  Jährliches Kirchgeld 
     
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
  8.005 bis    9.999 € 
10.000 bis 24.999 € 
25.000 bis 39.999 € 
40.000 bis 54.999 € 
55.000 bis 69.999 € 
70.000 € und mehr 
    5 € 
  10 € 
  25 € 
  45 € 
  70 € 
100 € 
     
Da der Kirchgeldbrief ein Steuerbescheid ist, bitten wir Sie, den entsprechenden Betrag für jeden Bescheid gesondert (z.B. bei 
Ehepaaren) und mit Angabe der Kirchgeldnummer (siehe Überweisungsformular) zu überweisen. Ihre Kirchgeldzahlung ist zum 
30.09.2012 fällig. 
Weitere Hinweise finden Sie auf der Rückseite. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich gerne an unser Servicetelefon […] oder schreiben Sie 
eine E‐Mail an […]. 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen 
 
Ihre 
 
[signature in handwriting] 
 
Stadtdekanin 
 
 
 
[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter] 
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 Informationen zum Kirchgeld 
1. Das Kirchgeld 
ist  neben  der  Kirchenlohn‐  und  Kircheneinkommensteuer  ein  Pflichtbeitrag,  der  einmal  jährlich  erhoben  wird  und  Ihrer 
Kirchengemeinde  vor  Ort  zu  Gute  kommt.  Das  Kirchgeld  verbleibt  in  der  […],  die  den  Ertrag  nach  den  Vorgaben  der 
Dekanatssynode  an die  Kirchengemeinden  sowie  übergemeindliche  und diakonische  Projekte  im Dekanatsbezirk  verteilt.  In 
Bayern  liegt der Hebesatz  für die Kirchenlohn‐ bzw. Kircheneinkommensteuer mit 8 % niedriger als  in den meisten anderen 
Bundesländern (dort 9 % von der Lohn‐ und Einkommensteuer). In Bayern gibt es zusätzlich das Kirchgeld. 
2. Gesetzliche Grundlage 
für die Erhebung des Kirchgeldes  ist das  staatliche Kirchensteuergesetz  (KirchStG)  in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 
21.11.1994 (GVBl. S. 1026), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22.12.2008 (GVBl. S. 973) und das Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz 
vom  09.12.2002  (zuletzt  geändert  mit  Gesetz  vom  11.12.2009,  KABl.  2010  S.  9)  sowie  die  Ausführungsverordnung  zum 
Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz  vom 15.10.2003  (zuletzt  geändert durch Verordnung  vom 07.12.2006, KABl.  2007  S. 18).  Sie 
finden die entsprechenden Gesetzestexte im Internet unter […]. Wir sind auch gerne bereit, sie Ihnen zuzusenden. 
3. Was haben Sie vom Kirchgeld? 
Viele Gemeinden und Dienste verwenden das Kirchgeld für ganz elementare Dinge wie die Instandhaltung ihrer Kirchen oder für 
Heizkosten. Mit dem Kirchgeld tragen Sie dazu bei, dass die Kirchen offen sind und den Menschen ein Zuhause bieten. Mit dem 
Kirchgeld unterstützen wir auch über 60 evangelische Kindergärten, die unseren Kindern christliche Werte vermitteln und so zu 
einer stabilen Basis ihrer Persönlichkeit beitragen. 
Die evangelische Kirche kümmert sich zudem um die sozialen Brennpunkte in der Region. Mit dem Kirchgeld können wichtige 
Projekte im Rahmen der Jugendsozialarbeit zur Resozialisierung von Jugendlichen weitergeführt werden. Wir verhindern so, dass 
junge Menschen ins soziale Abseits geraten. Darüber hinaus unterstützen Sie mit Ihrem Beitrag beispielsweise 17 Pflegedienste 
für alte und kranke Menschen. Konkrete Beispiele unserer Arbeit finden Sie auch in der beigefügten Mitgliederzeitung. 
4. Warum ist das Kirchgeld so wichtig? 
Das  Kirchgeld  gewinnt  für  die  Evang.‐Luth.  […]  zunehmend  an  Bedeutung, weil  die  Zuweisungen  der  Landeskirche  an  die 
Gemeinden  zurückgegangen  sind.  60 %  des Reinertrags  gehen  an die Gemeinden,  28 %  an die Diakonie und  12 %  an die 
übergemeindlichen Dienste (z.B. Beratungsstellen). Im Jahr 2011 wurden 1,7 Millionen Euro Kirchgeld eingezahlt. 
5. Befreit vom Kirchgeld sind 
• Alle Gemeindeglieder unter 18 Jahren 
• Gemeindeglieder über 18 Jahre, wenn ihre jährlichen Einkünfte unter 8.005 € liegen. 
Sollte einer dieser Punkte auf Sie zutreffen, können Sie  innerhalb eines Monats Einspruch einlegen. Dazu schicken Sie einfach 
diesen Brief mit einer kurzen Begründung zurück an die Evangelisch‐Lutherische […], […], oder eine entsprechende E‐Mail mit 
Angabe Ihrer Kirchgeldnummer (s. Überweisungsträger), Ihrem Vor‐ und Nachnamen und Ihrer Anschrift an […]. 
6. Steuermindernde Sonderausgabe 
Die Kirchgeldzahlung können Sie bei Ihrer Steuererklärung als Kirchensteuer geltend machen. 
7. Spenden 
Jeder Betrag, der die Höchstgrenze von 100 € übersteigt, gilt als Spende (Zuwendung), für die wir herzlich danken. Bei Zahlung 
eines Betrages zwischen 100 € und 300 € gilt der vereinfachte Zuwendungsnachweis. Hier genügt die Buchungsbestätigung des 
Kreditinstitutes für das Finanzamt, wenn daraus die begünstigte Körperschaft und der Zweck ersichtlich sind. Bei Zahlung über 
300 € erhalten Sie von uns automatisch eine Zuwendungsbescheinigung. 
8. Bereits erfolgte Zahlung 
Sollten Sie das Kirchgeld bereits gezahlt haben, betrachten Sie dieses Schreiben als gegenstandslos. Aus technischen Gründen ist 
es uns nicht möglich, eine bereits vor der Kirchgeldaufforderung getätigte Zahlung für das Jahr 2012 zu erfassen und damit zu 
verhindern, dass Sie einen Kirchgeldbrief erhalten. 
9. Weitere Informationen 
finden Sie im Internet unter […] 
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